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0.1. Abstract xv
0.1 Abstract
This thesis addresses an issue in the philosophy of mathematics which is lit-
tle discussed, and indeed little recognised. This issue is the phenomenon of
a `change of setting'. Changes of setting are events which involve a change
in a scientic framework which is fruitful for answering questions which were,
under an old framework, intractable. The formulation of the new setting usu-
ally involves a conceptual re-orientation to the subject matter. In the natural
sciences, such re-orientations are arguably unremarkable, inasmuch as it is pos-
sible that within the former setting for one's thinking one was merely in error,
and under the new orientation one is merely getting closer to the truth of the
matter. However, when the subject matter is pure mathematics, a problem
arises in that mathematical truth is (in appearance) timelessly immutable. The
conceptions that had been settled upon previously seem not the sort of thing
that could be vitiated. Yet within a change of setting that is just what seems
to happen. Changes of setting, in particular in their eects on the truth of
individual propositions, pose a problem for how to understand mathematical
truth.
Thus this thesis aims to give a philosophical analysis of the phenomenon
of changes of setting, in the spirit of the investigations performed in Wilson
(1992) and Manders (1987) and (1989). It does so in three stages, each of
which occupies a chapter of the thesis:
1. An analysis of the relationship between mathematical truth and setting-
changes, in terms of how the former must be viewed to allow for the latter.
This results in a conception of truth in the mathematical sciences which
gives a large role to the notion that a mathematical setting must `explain
xvi Contents
itself' in terms of the problems it is intended to address.
2. In light of (1), I begin an analysis of the change of setting engendered
in mathematical logic by Gottlob Frege. In particular, this chapter will
address the question of whether Frege's innovation constitutes a change of
setting, by asking the question of whether he is seeking to answer questions
which were present in the frameworks which preceded his innovations. I
argue that the answer is yes, in that he is addressing the Kantian question
of whether alternative systems of arithmetic are possible. This question
arises because it had been shown earlier in the 19th century that Kant's
conclusion, that Euclid's is the only possible description of space, was
incorrect.
3. I conclude with an in-depth look at a specic aspect of the logical system
constructed in Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. The purpose of this
chapter is to nd evidence for the conclusions of chapter two in Frege's
technical work (as opposed to the philosophical). This is necessitated
by chapter one's conclusions regarding the epistemic interdependence of
formal systems and informal views of those frameworks.
The overall goal is to give a contemporary account of the possibility of setting-
changes; it will turn out that an epistemic grasp of a mathematical system
requires that one understand it within a broader, somewhat historical context.
1. SETTINGS IN MATHEMATICS: A
HISTORICO-PHILOSOPHICAL OVERVIEW
This chapter sets forth a philosophical framework for the investigations which
follow in chapters 2 and 3. The purpose of this framework is twofold:
 It seeks to explain why certain mathematical `settings' - conceptual views
on formal frameworks - seem more accommodating to certain ideas, both
in terms of approaching subject matter and identifying that subject mat-
ter. This results in an approach to the philosophy of mathematics which
centers on the language of mathematics, thus encompassing both the for-
mal nature of actual mathematical investigation and the conceptual na-
ture of historical investigations.
 It seeks to take the reections carried out in the rst investigation and
using them to set up a historical methodology for an in-depth analysis of
the work of a specic thinker, Gottlob Frege, and the change of setting
which his work engendered.
Throughout I will emphasise the distinction between the formal language of
mathematical symbolism and its informal counterpart, conceived as a metalan-
guage. These reections are used in an investigation into both the conceptual
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and formal relationships between old and new settings.1 It turns out that a
semantic conception of mathematical truth best explains the foregoing conclu-
sions while at the same time avoiding the pitfalls of traditional Platonism.
That a semantic conception of mathematical truth serves to explain how we
can have a priori knowledge of mathematical truth whilst at the same time ac-
commodating the phenomenon of setting changes is the main conclusion of the
rst part of chapter one. This then serves as the basis of a framework for histor-
ical investigation. This framework will emphasise the need to place a thinker in
the intellectual climate of their time. With regard to the investigation of Frege's
change of setting which will make up chapters 2 and 3, this shift in emphasis
involves locating him in the context of the 19th-century tripartite division of
the philosophy of mathematics into transcendental idealism (descended from
Immanuel Kant), pre-Hilbert Formalism, and the Empiricism of John Stuart
Mill. Such a reading of Frege reveals aspects of his thought which have not
been fully appreciated in (all of) the literature on the subject.
While this kind of recognition of historical context is not a new desideratum
in the History and Philosophy of Science, my reasons for adopting it are not
the same as those often put forth by other thinkers. More often than not, this
methodological principle is motivated by concerns of the historian. My reasons
revolve around the conclusions reached in the non-historical, preliminary part
of this work; they are philosophical, and are underwritten by reections on the
epistemology of mathematics. It is essential to a change of setting that it be
able to explain its presence in terms of what has gone before; thus the historical
context of a change of setting (such as Hilbert's work in axiomatic geometry, or
1 The terms `old' and `new' are slightly misleading|no value judgement is intended when
one setting is described as `old' and another as `new'; temporal occurrence is merely being
used to mark one from the other. It is quite possible that an old setting may be superior to
a new one. In such cases, the change of setting may be regarded as `unsuccessful'.
3Frege's innovations in mathematical logic) is just as vital to our understanding of
the resulting system as its formal aspects. In this, the history of the philosophy
of mathematics goes hand in hand with contemporary research into the subject.
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1.1 Introduction
In the history of mathematics, there are many instances of statements appear-
ing resistant to (dis)proof for long periods of time, until what may be termed `a
change of setting' takes place. Problematic theorems, which may be the product
of conceptual diculties or technically impoverished approaches, can take on a
new, more tractable form. An example is Riemann's claim that elliptic func-
tions exhibit more comprehensible behaviour when dened over a `doughnut' of
complex values, as opposed to the complex plane.2 The complex doughnut is
a new setting for elliptic functions|while not originally conceived in terms of
such contexts, these functions are reconceived in terms which make them easier
to understand and predict. In terms of the progress of mathematics as a science,
this is prima facie a good thing. The mathematician Philip Davis notes how
...in mathematics there is a long and vitally important record of im-
possibilities being broken by the introduction of structural changes.
(1987; cited in Wilson [1992], p.150)
However, from a philosophical point of view, this `vitally important' phenomenon
raises a problem. Mathematical truth is usually taken to be eternal and, as such,
independent of events which occur in the physical world. When a change of set-
ting takes place, it is often the case that while some statements in the original
context benet from the change, others that were true (maybe trivially so) will
become false. One example of just this is that of moving from an ane geo-
metrical setting to a projective one; the statement `parallel lines never meet' is
falsied. Thus, the idea that mathematical impossibilities can be `broken' chal-
2 Wilson (1992), p.151
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lenges the supposed permanence, the Platonic timelessness, of mathematical
truth.
In this discussion, I will focus on one aspect of this `breaking of impossi-
bilities'. The change of setting will only fruitfully break impossibilities if such
changes result in what can be thought of as a more `natural' conception of the
problems which lead to the need for the changes in the rst place. Now, in
order for this to be the case, it needs to be the same question which is being
addressed in the new setting as in the old one. What we have here is a new
appearance of the old question as to what constitutes the dierence between
change within a framework, and a change of framework. Not only this, but it
must also be the case that the conception of the new setting is a non-trivial
intellectual accomplishment.
With these points in mind, in x1.2 I will give an example of a change of
setting rendering possible new mathematical results. x1.3 will begin a philo-
sophical analysis of this phenomenon, beginning with a treatment of the relation
between the roles played by deductive rigour and conceptual clarity in consti-
tuting mathematical knowledge. Section 1.4 will sketch a philosophical view
of the nature of mathematical knowledge which can incorporate, and account
for, the conclusions of xx1.2 and 1.3. This philosophical approach will then, in
chapters two and three, be brought to bear on a historical investigation of the
contributions made by Gottlob Frege to the change of setting within the eld
of mathematical logic which occurred in the period from the late 1800's to the
early 1900's.
6 1. Settings in Mathematics: A Historico-Philosophical Overview
1.2 Example of a Setting-Change: Hilbert and the
Metamathematical Analysis of the Parallel Postulate
In 1904 David Hilbert published the standard-setting book The Foundations of
Geometry. Although before this publication, results were known which are seen
as leading up to it,3 this volume contains what is probably the rst comprehen-
sive axiomatic application of what has come to be known as `model-theoretic'
techniques. Hilbert sought to answer a question which had been concerning
mathematicians since the time of the ancient Greeks: what exactly is the logi-
cal relationship between Euclid's parallel postulate and his other postulates and
common notions?4 This question had become a more pressing since the early
1800's, for two reasons: rstly, Kant's doctrine of geometry as synthetic a pri-
ori5 oered an impressive answer to the question of the applicability of geometry
to experience. However, secondly, it was regarded as implying that Euclidean
geometry (with the parallel postulate) is the only system of geometry|an impli-
cation that was regarded as intolerable by most accomplished mathematicians
in Hilbert's time.
In order to conduct his investigation, Hilbert made two important innova-
tions. The rst is the notion of an implicit denition; the second is his technique
of proving the independence of one statement from a collection of others. Both
of these are fundamentally linked to the notion of an axiom. Traditionally, an
axiom is taken to be a kind of truth, usually one which is `self-evident'|either
not requiring, or incapable of, proof. As such, axioms are the starting-point
3 In axiomatics, mainly by the Italian school associated with Guiseppe Peano (see Toretti
(1978), pp.223-227); in modeling non-Euclidean geometry, by Beltrami, Klein and Poincare
(see ibid p.125{137; p.169).
4 From here on referred to by the modern term `axioms'.
5 While the actual arguments for Kant's conclusion will not be related at this stage, they
will be related in the discussion of Frege which is to follow.
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for any rigorous mathematical investigation; Euclid himself set the standard in
his Elements. However, there had always been an element of suspicion regard-
ing one of Euclid's axioms, the parallel postulate (also known as Euclid's `fth
axiom'). The parallel postulate states that:
If a straight line falling on two straight lines make the interior angles
on the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines,
if produced indenitely, meet on that side on which are the angles
less than the two right angles. (Heath (1956) Vol.I, p.1556)
This is equivalent to the statement that, given a line and a point not on that
line, there is one and only one line that runs through that point which does not
intersect with that line. Geometrical systems developed in the 1820's, utilising
the method of Cartesian co-ordinates, were developed that denied the parallel
postulate but armed the rest of Euclid's axioms.7 Before this, many mathe-
maticians throughout history (from ancient Greece, through medieval Islamic
programme of mathematics, to Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies) had tried to prove that the parallel postulate either is a consequence
of Euclid's other axioms and denitions or that it contradicts them. Suce
to say, this was never accomplished (though some came near, as we shall see).
However, there was not, until Hilbert's Foundations of Geometry, any rigorous
way to prove that the statement about parallels is independent of the other
statements|that it neither contradicts nor is a consequence of the other ax-
ioms. This is why Hilbert's work in geometry presents us with an instance of a
change of setting.
6 Cited in Toretti (1978), p.41
7 Ibid., p.40
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1.2.1 Implicit Denition
Hilbert's innovation was to look at the system of Euclidean geometry itself as
a mathematical object. Now, this involved a certain level of abstraction from
the then-typical views of geometry, in that statements made within the system
are to be regarded as `uninterpreted'. For Euclid, geometry was the science of
space; and as such, geometrical objects (such as points, lines and planes) are
entities which may possess properties which are incidental to geometry itself. In
contrast, uninterpreted mathematical objects have no properties beyond those
ascribed by the relevant axioms. For instance, the statement `a straight line can
always be drawn between two points' is no longer seen as actually being about
points or lines, in the usual senses of the terms. It is to be seen as uninterpreted.
The terms `point', `line', `plane', `angle', and so forth, are nothing more than
what the axioms describe them to be. That is to say, a `point' is anything that
`lies upon' a `plane', where a `plane' is anything which satises the conditions set
forth in the axioms. This progressively more abstract conception of geometry is
described by Historian of Geometry Roberto Torretti in the following passage:
[O]ne can approximately see what [abstract axiomatics] means by
recalling the well-known thesis of Hilbert, that the planes, lines and
points of his Grundlagen may be taken to be any threefold collection
of things|Hilbert once proposed chairs, tables and beer-mugs|
which, given a suitable interpretation of the undened properties
of incidence, betweenness and congruence, happen to stand in the
relations characterised by his axioms. (1978, p.190)
This is the notion of an implicit denition. The objects which are called `points',
`lines', and `planes' are not dened explicitly, as in `a point is an object which
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. . . '. Rather, the axioms are statements which `dene' or `establish' the terms
`point', `line', and `plane' as whatever can be thought of as being referred to by
those terms without the axioms becoming false. Thus, the axioms of geometry
become stipulated conditions on the logical behaviour of these terms relative
to one another. The point is that we are looking at the logical relationships
between the axioms and theorems, rather than any intuitive content they may
possess. The symbol `point', a certain series of marks on a piece of paper, now
behaves exactly as the axioms state that it does. Nothing more, nothing less.
1.2.2 Independence and Model Theory
The methods employed by Hilbert in this investigation show the beginnings of
what is known today as model theory.8 In model theory, a collection of objects
is combined with a group of axioms (stated in a given language L) dening
those objects. Call the set of axioms  and the set of objects A. We then dene
a satisfaction function v as v : L 7! A from the variable symbols in L to the
objects in A. The function v, together with the set of objects A, is called a
model of  when a given formula S derived from the axioms can be `satised'
by the model (written  j=A S). This happens just in case v is able to map all
the free variables in S to objects in A in such a way as to make S true. For
example, say we have a language M which contains the usual logical symbols
(8;!;: etc), a countable number of variable symbols (v1; v2; : : : vn; : : :), and
the arithmetical symbols +, , and =. Assume that these arithmetical symbols
are dened in the usual way. Then, the set N combined with the satisfaction
function s :M 7! N which maps vn to n  1 2 N (so that s(v1) = 0, s(v6) = 5,
8 In what follows, I utilise notation and conventions which actually developed after the
work of Hilbert. Thus, my exposition is in a certain sense anachronistic; however, nothing
in the exposition contradicts the spirit of Hilbert's techniques. The notation is derived from
that in Enderton's A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2001).
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etc) is a model of arithmetic on the natural numbers.
Now, a group of axioms  in a language L can have more than one model,
and it is possible that not all models of  will be equivalent.9 Without a model,
a group of axioms in a language is uninterpreted; it could be `about' anything
(although for most axiom groups there are `intended' or `standard' models, such
as N for the rst-order Peano axioms). An expression K is independent relative
to an axiom group  if and only if there is a model of  [ fKg and also a
model of  [ f:Kg. It is important to note that it is desirable that all axioms
in a group be independent of one another; if an axiom A can be derived from
   fAg then we may as well de-list A as an axiom, and let it be a theorem.
Also, knowing that each of a collection of axioms is independent from the others
re-enforces the notion that they are logically basic, and cannot be reduced any
further.
As mentioned above, mathematicians had been struggling for centuries with
the status of the parallel postulate relative to the rest of geometry|especially
in terms of whether it is a theorem of Euclid's axioms or contradicts them.
It is, in fact, neither|it is independent from those other axioms. Let E de-
note Euclid's (or rather, Hilbert's) axioms, and let p be the parallel postulate.
Hilbert showed that there is a model of E[fpg|the intended model, Euclidean
space.10 However, there is also a model of E [ f:pg. This model is sometimes
known as the `Beltrami-Klein sphere'; it is characterised by the interior surface
9 The main notion of equivalence between models is that of `isomorphism'; two models are
`isomorphic' if and only if there is a one-one correspondence between the elements of the two
models which preserves the functions and relations. Thus one model can be `translated' into
another without any signicant alteration; it is more like an exercise in re-lettering.
10 All of Hilbert's models are described analytically, that is, via functions on R3 (See Katz
(1993) p.721 and Toretti (1978) pp.236{8 for details). Thus any supposed circularity in
invoking Euclidean geometry as a model of the axioms is avoided; however, it also turns
out that Hilbert's proofs are of relative consistency|the models are consistent if and only if
arithmetic is.
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of a sphere (points in non-Euclidean space are points on the interior surface of
the sphere; lines in this space are chords along the surface).11 Thus, the parallel
postulate neither follows from nor contradicts the actual content of the other
axioms, although it could well interfere with our intuitive interpretations of that
content. Hilbert also gave models which showed the independence of some of
the other axioms from each other|for instance, a model which was consistent
with the negation of the Archimedean axiom.12
To summarise, Hilbert's work on the foundations of geometry constitute a
change of setting because he made explicit a result which, though known at the
time, had not been placed in the larger context of abstract axiomatic systems.
Beltrami, Klein and Poincare had all found ways to `embed' non-Euclidean
geometries into Euclidean ones, thereby showing that they were consistent if
Euclid's was. However, Hilbert shifted the focus from the relationship of non-
Euclidean geometries to Euclid's to the more abstract level of the relationships
uninterpreted systems of axioms bear to real analysis. Furthermore, the new
perspective leads to the new results in a somewhat natural manner. For ex-
ample, while Hilbert himself did not address the notion of completeness|that
every true statement of Euclidean geometry can be derived from his axioms|
such results were soon found by other mathematicians.13 Indeed, Hilbert was
himself soon stating that an absolute consistency proof for arithmetic should be
an important priority for mathematicians14|the very idea of the need for such
a proof arises directly from the shift to abstract axiomatics of which Hilbert's
11 Toretti (1978), p.237; cf. p.133
12 Ibid., p.237/8
13 \It is virtually certain. . . that Hilbert believed that his system was complete. In fact,
several mathematicians soon showed that all of the theorems of Euclidean geometry could be
proved using Hilbert's axioms." (Katz 1993, p.721)
14 This was Hilbert's `second problem' and was proved unsatisable by Godel's Incomplete-
ness Theorem (see Mac Lane 1983, p.379; pp.428{30 contains a discussion of some other
problem's on Hilbert's list). It is important to note that Godel would probably not have
found his result if not for Hilbert's statement.
12 1. Settings in Mathematics: A Historico-Philosophical Overview
work on geometry was a direct demonstration. The change is not an ad-hoc,
stopgap measure, but a fruitful restructuring of the whole inquiry. It is this phe-
nomenon, of a change of setting resulting in the conceptual clarication which
is displayed by the increased ease of solving old conjectures and the appearance
of new insights, which I will seek to philosophically address.
1.3 Changes of Setting: A Philosophical View
This section commences a philosophically contemporary analysis of the phe-
nomenon of changes of setting. As mentioned above, there are several main
aspects of this investigation which will be of particular concern. First of all, we
have two seemingly contradictory, but deeply connected, features of a change
of setting which we must reconcile.
 That when a setting is changed and apparently results in `new' solutions
to `old' problems, these new solutions are in fact solutions to the same
problems which were present in the old setting. That is to say, change of
setting 6= change of topic.
 That the formulation of the new setting is a `non-trivial intellectual achieve-
ment'. This essentially means that the new setting genuinely extends the
old; it has not resulted from ad hoc stipulations, nor is it completely dis-
continuous with the old setting (i.e. is not simply a new eld of study).
In terms of the discussion of Hilbert's work on the foundations of geometry,
the rst feature is the idea that Hilbert's proof of the independence of the
parallel postulate does in fact apply to the parallel postulate which is present
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in Euclid's Elements, as well as its negation in non-Euclidean geometries. That
is to say, the abstract axiomatic system analysed by Hilbert is `the same as'
that developed by Euclid (in some as-yet undened notion of `sameness'). The
second is the notion that Hilbert's new setting|that in which the axiomatic
geometry is uninterpreted|is a conceptually `natural' extension of the work
done by Klein, Beltrami and Poincare, and sheds light on those approaches.
In order to nd a philosophical perspective which is able to accommodate and
explain this phenomenon of change of setting (especially in view of the fact
that setting-changes seem to violate the Platonic timelessness of mathematical
truth), we must begin by looking at some of the overall features of mathematical
knowledge which are largely beyond dispute; that it is in some sense `global',
and that it is a priori
The philosopher and mathematician Rene Descartes considered mathemati-
cal knowledge to be possessed of two dening qualities: clarity and distinctness.
Mathematical objects are distinct because they are dened by all and only those
statements which are true of them. For instance, the number `7' is dened by
all the sums, dierences, products, etc. which it produces when combined with
other numbers.15 This is in direct contrast to scientic objects (such as organ-
isms, molecules, and planets) which are considered to be essentially constant
even when statements formerly thought true of them are falsied (light is not
considered to be a physically dierent phenomenon to what it was in the 17th
century, even though we now know that it does not always travel in `straight'
lines).
15 It is true that this seems to not be the case when it comes to transnite numbers:
7 @0 = @0, as does n @0 for any n  @0; however this can be taken as a dening characteristic
of what it means to be `a number less than or equal to @0'.
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Mathematical knowledge is clear because it provides conceptual reication
of whatever is being studied; for instance, the proof of the Pythagorean theorem
adds to our concept of `triangle' by making explicit general facts about certain
types of triangles which implicitly follow from what it is for those triangles to
be those types of triangles in the rst place. Ideally, we should always know
why a theorem holds. These two qualities, clarity and distinctness, can become
opposed, as we shall see.
Philosopher of Mathematics Kenneth Manders16 argues that the modern
approach to the analysis of mathematical knowledge (via mathematical logic)
has been concerned almost exclusively with the quality of distinctness; thus
it is inadequate to the task of explaining setting-changes. This is because re-
cent foundational work in mathematics singularly addresses the epistemological
issue of reliability, in terms of analysing exclusively the methods of inference
employed in mathematical reasoning. Under this conception, the hallmark of
mathematical knowledge is the iron-clad reliability of its inferences; and as such,
\...the aspect of distinctness [makes] sure that the objects of study are pre-
cisely determined and reliably reasoned about."17 It is the critical evaluation
of these inferences which provides the research programme for mathematical
logic; and hence, distinctness and reliability readily combine into an approach
to the foundations of mathematics (one which, while fruitful in certain aspects,
cannot address the phenomenon of setting-changes; and hence cannot be the
whole story).
One issue Manders raises with this conception is that it lends itself to taking
individual propositions18 as the units of investigation. There is little scope for
16 In his (1987)
17 Ibid., p.202
18 and inferences: an inference from A to B can be rendered as the proposition `if A, then
B ', or `from A, infer B ', although one would not want to iterate this process ad innitum.
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addressing mathematical theories19 as wholes, and thus likewise for investigating
the conceptual relationships between theories, especially in terms of why it is
that some theories seem to be more accommodating to certain concepts than
others. From the reliability-centred point of view, \...mathematical progress is
nothing but piling up one theorem on another."20 As long as it is the formal
qualities of inferences which are the focus of foundational research (and not
the content), little eort is made in the direction of why theories extend in
one direction rather than another, or why insights sometimes rise from some
investigations and not others.21
In opposition to this kind of approach, Manders advocates a return to the
Cartesian emphasis on the interdependence of clarity and distinctness in char-
acterising mathematical knowledge. As the conceptual clarity of a theorem is a
product of the relationship between the theorem and its background theory, it
is a global feature of the background theory. This means that the distinctness-
come-reliability approach is by itself inadequate; this is due to its emphasis on
individual propositions, over entire theories, as autonomous objects of knowl-
edge.22 This is doubly so when seeking to understand why some theories render
19 Throughout this discussion, I will be talking of mathematical `systems' and mathematical
`settings'. While these terms are not intended to be synonymous, they overlap considerably;
in terms of the discussion in xx1.3 and 1.4, a setting is `rigorised' into a system, through the
introduction of deductively closed codications of the setting into a formal language. The
term `theory' is intended to cover both cases.
20 Ibid., p.195. Compare this with a remark by F.F. Bonsall on the validity of computer-
assisted proofs in mathematics: \If such a problem, the four colour problem, for example,
is solved by some clever new idea, that is magnicent; but a solution by the cumulative
application of existing methods may do nothing more than demonstrate the cleverness of the
solver." (`A Down-to-earth View of Mathematics', American Mathematical Monthly Vol. 89
(1982) p.13; reprinted in Fauvel & Gray (eds) 1987, The History of Mathematics: A Reader,
p.599
21 A prime example: \. . . I have recently heard it said that, whereas a complete proof of
Fermat's theorem might prove mathematically insignicant, the older partial results on this
problem (such as E.E. Kummer's) are \deep" in that they reveal hidden hidden aspects of the
integers which become manifest only when they are imbedded within richer realms of \ideal
numbers"." (Wilson 1992, p.112)
22 Manders (1987), p.202
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some theorems more comprehensible, as this involves a higher-level relationship
between the setting where the theorem or conjecture was originally formulated,
and the alternative setting which renders it further comprehensible. Hence, I
will seek an explication of this notion of the clarity component of `naturalness',
by presenting it in contrast with distinctness-come-reliability. I will argue that
seeing distinctness and clarity, or modern variants thereof, as working in tandem
yields a way of viewing the connections between mathematical theories which
can account for the seeming phenomenon of a result becoming more `natural'
once a change of setting has taken place.
1.3.1 Distinctness
In modern mathematics, the ultimate standard of reliability is the (possibil-
ity, in principle of) embedding the system into set theory (usually ZF or ZF
+ choice). Under this conception, all mathematical objects are sets, and all
operations are operations on sets; the languages of individual theories are just
convenient shorthands for the language of sets. The only non-logical operation
is set membership|all other resources belong to the logical theory. However,
mathematical objects are entirely constituted by what is true of them. There
is nothing more to any number (or a set-theoretic representation of a number)
than its set-theoretic interactions with other numbers|and thus, nothing more
to any set than its interactions with other sets. From a logical point of view,
the result of this conception of mathematics is that there is no way to conceive
of there being any conceptual continuity between two dierent mathematical
theories. For instance, in the system of natural numbers (N), some dierences
cannot be calculated due to the absence of negative numbers. Thus
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8x8y9z(x  y = z)
is false when x,y,z range over N, but true when they range over Z (the integers).
Hence these x,y,z denote dierent objects when those objects are taken from
Z as opposed to N;23 and thus the above sentence, by virtue of its ability to
have dierent truth-values in dierent theories, is actually a `typographically
ambiguous' representation of two dierent sentences. Hence `5' and `+5' denote
dierent objects. To paraphrase Quine, `deny the doctrine and you change
the subject'. These considerations can be extrapolated to apply not just to
numbers, but also to functions, sets, and all other mathematical objects. Thus,
while objects internal to a mathematical theory are interdependent in terms of
their properties and relations (if one property or relation is altered, the whole
theory undergoes a systematic change), the total opposite is the case when it
comes to an inter-theory perspective. All theories, conceived as wholes, are
completely autonomous.
The outcome of this, as mentioned previously, is the complete loss of the
ability to even conceive of any conceptual continuity between dierent settings;
there cannot be reasons, internal to a theory, as to why that theory should be
a preferred object of study over others. In the words of philosopher of science
Mark Wilson, \. . . any self-consistent domain is equally worthy of mathemat-
ical investigation; preference for a given domain is justied only by aesthetic
considerations, personal whim or its potential physical applications."24
It may be countered that this is where set theory is able to do some explain-
23 This follows from the converse of Leibniz's identity of indiscerniblesIf everything true of
an object A is true of an object B, then A = B. The converse would be if at least one thing
true of A is not true of B, then A 6= B.
24 (1992), p.112
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ing. If two theories are both able to be embedded in set theory, and thus all
objects of both theories are treated as sets and all operations on those objects
as operations on sets, then we have a way to conceive of continuity between
theories. `5' and `+5' both denote the same set.25 However, while this does
supply continuity, it has the eect of completely doing away with the other
aspect of of our investigation|that the formulation of new settings which leads
to increased comprehensibility of theorems and conjectures is a non-trivial in-
tellectual accomplishment. It seems that the bump in the rug has merely been
shifted, not smoothed out. In Manders' words,
[S]et theoretic denability [does not] by itself set apart those rela-
tionships between (set theoretically denable) conceptual settings
which constitute successful reconceptualisations...from the innitely
many completely uninteresting ones. (1987, p.200; emphasis added)
Thus, we have a dichotomy. On the one hand, one setting cannot be a more
natural home for a theorem than another because the expression in the new
setting expresses something dierent. Elliptic functions do not achieve addi-
tional clarity when dened over a complex doughnut rather than the complex
plane, because they are by denition dierent functions. On the other hand,
one setting cannot be more natural than another because all settings are inter-
pretations of set theory, and thus possess the same epistemic status. We have
a dichotomous separation, with seemingly no middle path; and either way, the
occurrence of fruitful changes of setting cannot be explained.
25 Up to isomorphism: e.g. Zermelo vs. von Neumann ordinals.
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1.3.2 Clarity
Over-emphasis on the reliability-theoretic approach (allied as it is with almost
exclusive concern for distinctness) also results in the loss of our other major
concern, clarity. Manders notes that \...fully formalised proofs are often un-
intelligible...increased precision is often achieved at the expense of clarity."26
Likewise, mathematician Saunders Mac Lane observes that
All mathematics can indeed be built up within set theory, but the
description of many mathematical objects as structures [i.e., as sen-
sitive to setting] is much more illuminating than some explicit set-
theoretic description. (1996, p.182)
To state the obvious, most mathematicians do not `think' in set theory. They
think in what may be termed an informal metalangauge, where intuitive no-
tions are used and explored in nding inspiration for taking research in certain
directions, or using a certain proof strategy in some particular instance. The
reliability-centered approach, and its attendant loss of conceptual continuity
and/or respect for innovation, is an expression of the often implicit assumption
that mathematics is purely a matter of rendering its objects distinct, in a formal
and hence reliable manner.
We would do well to take note of the fact that when a new theory is being
formulated and investigated, it is yet to be possessed of the rigorous formal-
isation into (usually) a formal (and hence reliable) language. Thus, maximal
distinctness is not yet available as a fully cohesive view of the new theory. It is
only once the theory has reached a certain point of maturation that it can be
26 Manders (1987), p.202 [order reversed]
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thus codied, and the formal claims can be stated in absence of the conceptual.
However, there are historical cases where one or more of the developments which
constitute formalisation have preceded the rest, and thus themselves served as
the stimulus for research into a new area. Nevertheless, it seems that the major-
ity of cases are those which arise from the search for conceptual clarity. In the
words of Manders, \...genuine mathematical accomplishment consists primarily
in making clear by using new concepts."27
Be that as it may, Manders goes on to observe that \...results also have to be
correct to count as making something clear..."28 But, if the new setting is yet
to be mathematically rigourised to the point of constituting a new calculating
system, how can these results be known to be correct? We are observing the
return of the reliability condition. To get clear about the kind of conception
we need, I will rst outline the philosophical position known as `nave realism'
regarding mathematical objects|also known as `Platonism', often regarded as
the default position of the working mathematician in contemporary philosophy
of mathematics.
1.3.3 Nave Realism, Set Theory, and Epistemology
The standard contemporary formulation of nave realism about mathematics is
a conjunction of two claims:29
27 Manders (1987), p.193 (emphasis original)
28 Ibid.
29 See, for instance, Mac Lane (1986) p.3: \It is remarkable that (almost) all Mathematical
objects can be constructed out of sets. . . Hence arises the view that Mathematics deals with
just the properties of sets and that these properties can be deduced from a suitable list of
axioms for sets. . . This set-theoretic description of mathematics is often coupled with a strong
belief that these sets objectively exist in some ideal realm."
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 that all mathematical theories can be reduced to set theory, and
 that sets exist in an objective, timeless manner which is ontologically
independent of the material world (in particular, the beings and doings of
mathematicians).
This can include existence claims for not unmysterious objects such as innite
sets, choice functions, and so on. Sometimes the claims about set theory are
left to the side; existence claims are made directly about the subjects of specic
mathematical theories.30 The main point is that these objects are non-physical
and non-temporal.
Such properties, usually associated with abstract objects, lead to many prob-
lems for nave realism about mathematical objects. Among these is the well-
known issue of epistemic access: if mathematical objects are timeless and do
not occupy any spacial location, then it seems that we are incapable of the
kind of interaction with them that is required for our gaining knowledge of
their properties.31 Also problematic is the (sometimes unexpected) applicabil-
ity of mathematics to many real-world phenomena (again, a consequence of
mathematical objects' non-physical existence). Due to the already vast extant
literature on the subject, I will go no further than to state an alternative to
nave realism, the `semantic conception'.32
30 \There are other versions of platonism for mathematics, for example one in which the
ideal realms are comprised of numbers and spatial forms (the \ideal triangle")." (Ibid.)
31 An inuential paper (among many) in this vein is Benacerraf (1973) `Mathematical
Truth', The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.70, No.19, pp.661{669
32 This view, or a similar one, often goes by the moniker `conventionalism'; however, this
term has considerable historical baggage, which I wish to avoid.
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Under the semantic conception, we know mathematical truths because they
are truths of meaning; often described as `true by denition,'33 they are able
to be applied to our physical surroundings because they are the result of the
same phenomena as ordinary language usage. That is to say, mathematics is a
system of interrelated terms and predicates, which are only dierent in degree
(as opposed to being dierent in kind) to everyday terms and predicates. Math-
ematical truth is thus a variety of linguistic truth, and mathematical `objects'
are on par ontologically with linguistic terms. This means that our epistemic
access to, and the empirical applicability of, mathematics becomes just as prob-
lematic as the existence and applicability of the term `dog'. And while it is the
case that ordinary natural language has its own philosophical issues, it should
soon become clear that not only does the semantic conception of mathematics
avoid the pitfalls of nave realism, it also supplies us with an interesting and
novel way of conceiving of the relationship between inter-theory conceptual con-
tinuity and its non-trivial attainability, thus supplying us with a coherent view
of changes of setting.
Now, the semantic conception of mathematical truth can be described by
opponents in terms so uncharitable as to make it seem unacceptable to working
mathematicians. A particular instance is the claim that it makes the discov-
ery/invention of new mathematical ideas `arbitrary'. That is to say, if math-
ematical truth is of the same metaphysical category as linguistic truth, then
that truth depends on us; specically, on what we accept as the correct mean-
ing/usage for any given mathematical term. As stated by philosopher S. G.
Shanker:
33 And thus analytic. However, as it is not especially pertinent to my case, I will not
address the question as to whether mathematical truths are analytic or synthetic (requiring
more than knowledge of the meaning of the sub-sentential terms in order for their truth
to be determined); nor will I touch upon the other philosophical bugbear of whether the
analytic/synthetic distinction is ultimately viable.
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The most common criticism levelled against [the semantic concep-
tion] is that mathematical truth must be sempiternal and universal:
properties that outstrip the reach of conventions, which are rooted
to the decisions of a speaker or community. (1987, p.303)
Moreover:
The feeling behind [this] criticism is that the [semanticist] contends
that a mathematical proposition only expresses either a speaker's
or a community's decision to use symbols in a certain way. (Ibid.,
p.304)
Hence, if this truth is dependant on us, then it is inferred that we are `free' to
use the symbols in any way we want. We can make any mathematical statement
true or false, with the justication for such decisions not originating from within
the theory itself. In terms of the discussion of Hilbert and abstract axiomatics
(x1.2), the objection would be that Hilbert's axiomatic analysis does not `tell'
us anything about the relationships between Euclidean and non-Euclidean ge-
ometries because the reasons we accept Hilbert's analysis are not `geometrical'
reasons. The parallel postulate is independent not because of any relationship
between it and the other axioms, but because we act as if it were independent.
Because this is a decision (to act in a certain way), and not a discovery (of
a certain fact), it cannot tell us anything. For another example, all that is
required for the Goldbach conjecture to be considered true (and thus, actually
be true) is that all or most mathematicians in the world start considering it to
be true. That is, that it becomes a property of all the symbols which denote
natural numbers greater than two and divisible by two that they cannot appear
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in the formula
8n2N9p2P9q2Pn 6= p+ q
where P is the set of primes. Because, under the semantic conception of math-
ematical truth, there is no gap between accepted truth and actual truth, oppo-
nents of this approach take it to be a position which trivialises or disregards the
accomplishment inherent in a mathematician's solution of a dicult problem
(and thus take it as a view which is totally incompatible with our intuitions
regarding mathematical knowledge). Concurrent is the notion that when for-
mulating a new mathematical system, we are free to make any axiom, rule or
object behave in any way we want to, without the constraints normally seen
as necessary to have mathematics `make sense' (another supposedly counterin-
tuitive conclusion). I argue that these conclusions do not follow; an important
corollary of doing so supplies an explanation of the phenomenon of successful
setting-changes.
That is the uncharitable description of the semantic conception. My descrip-
tion, considerably more conducive to the practice of the working mathematician,
issues from the following idea: that while it is indeed the case that we are `free'
when constructing new mathematical theories, this does not mean that any old
way of doing things will suce. However, I cleave to the semantic conception's
notion that mathematical truth does not exist prior to recognition; the truths
of (pure) mathematics are not `out there' to be discovered. We `make' some
mathematical statements true, others false, by regarding them as such. Nev-
ertheless, this `making' is not done by any force of will or raw desire, but by
a process more akin to being `convinced'. Not only do we have to regard a
statement as a result of another for it to be so, we also have to regard it as a
mathematical result for the result to be part of mathematics.
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Now, it seems plausible to regard most mathematicians as believing that
it is both possible and desirable for mathematics to one day be organised into
a vast interlinking network, where every mathematical truth is logically con-
nected to the sum total of all other mathematical truths. Thus it seems we
have at least one constraint on the choices to be made when a new system is
being constructed: the new system cannot be so strange and bizarre as to be
unrecognisable as mathematics to the average mathematician.34 This, in turn,
leads to further constraints. For one, the rules of derivation (be they explicitly
stated, or only used implicitly) must be possessed of some kind of constancy.
For instance, `take propositions A and B ; ip a coin; if the result is heads, then
B is a mathematical consequence of A' does not seem acceptable and, therefore,
it is not acceptable. A system which says this about mathematics simply is not
mathematical.
Furthermore, and more importantly, the new theory must be able to `ex-
plain' its presence, usually in terms of theories already existent (which may or
may not have served as the initial motivation for the formulation of the new
theory). Thus, analytic geometry `explains its presence' by being able to oer
one singular proof of a situation which may require several synthetic proofs.35
Hilbert's pioneering use of model theory explains its presence by giving a math-
ematical account of the independence of the parallel postulate that is in accord
with our intuitive notions of what axioms are and how they should behave.
Perhaps one of the most eloquent statements, by way of analogy with musical
composition, of this situation is the following:
34 It may be argued that there are historical exceptions to this rule; the introduction of
`imaginary' numbers, or maybe Kronecker's opposition to Cantor's explorations of completed
innities. My belief is that it can be counter-argued that (1) these cases will always be in
the minority, and (2) the subsequent acceptance of these techniques bears them out. What
is important is the attitude of the entire mathematical community, not the attitudes of one
or two exceptionally vocal and well-placed critics.
35 SeeWilson (1992), pp.117{125 for an in-depth example in this particular change of setting.
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A succession of two musical notes is an act of choice; the rst causes
the second, not in the scientic sense of making it occur necessar-
ily, but in the historical sense of provoking it, of providing it with
a motive for occurring. A successful melody is a self-determining
history; it is freely what it intends to be, yet is a meaningful whole,
not an arbitrary succession of notes. (Auden, 1975, p.465-6)36
It is in this `historical sense' that we should regard one mathematical theory as
being `caused' by another. Note that this implies two things|one, mathemati-
cal `objects' are not required beyond being linguistic entities; the nave realist's
epistemic access and applicability worries vanish|and two, the `explaining it-
self' that a mathematical theory needs to be seen to do is an ongoing process,
one which accompanies the progression toward rigorisation hinted at above.
For example, up until modern times, the axioms of Euclidean geometry
were held to be self-evident; this self-evidence was taken to be known through
some kind of `intuition'. The idea of intuition underpinning the (base) truths
of mathematics found its culmination in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant,
in his holding that mathematical truths are synthetic a priori (for Kant, all
synthetic knowledge is reached via intuition). As is well known, the advent
of non-Euclidean geometry had most philosophers of mathematics (and most
mathematicians) concluding that it is in fact self-consistency which is the driv-
ing force of mathematical truth, and not some kind of psychological faculty or
occurrence.37 These events occurred mostly in the 19th century; the early 20th
century saw the rise of model and proof theory, the mathematically rigorised
counterparts to our pre-theoretic notion of axiomatics.
36 Cited in Shanker, 1987, p.338
37 Brouwer and his followers can be regarded as possible exceptions; however, their con-
clusions entailed a kind of revisionism which was seen as unacceptable by most of their
contemporaries.
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In his Grundlagen der Geometrie, Hilbert gave mathematical reasons for
why certain mathematical statements are not even pre-theoretic logical con-
sequences of one another; the existence of these models proved that it was
metaphysically possible for one axiom to be true while the others are all false,
and the mathematical rigour of his method gave compelling reasons to regard it
rational to believe that this is the case. Hilbert quotes Kant in that work: \All
human knowledge begins with intuitions, thence passes to concepts and ends
with ideas".38 However, philosopher of mathematics Stewart Shapiro notes in
his analysis of the origins of model theory39 that \...the plan executed in that
work is far from Kantian. In Hilbert's hands, the slogan \passes to concepts
and ends with ideas" comes to something like \is replaced by logical relations
between ideas."" Furthermore, \In Hilbert's writing...the role of intuition is
carefully and rigourously limited to motivation and heuristic."40 Thus, we can
see that the notion of `intuitive' consequence operant in Kant's conception of
the foundations of geometry gets replaced by `logical consequence' in Hilbert's
axiomatisation, where the `logical' is understood as `model-theoretic'.
It is possible to see Hilbert'sGrundlagen as a historical, explicit instantiation
of what occurs implicitly in most extensions and subsequent rigorisations of
mathematical elds of inquiry (i.e. changes of setting). At the outset, intuitive
notions of mathematical consequence and what objects/operations are present
in the setting are primarily operant|witness how the propositions of Euclid's
Elements are things that one is proposed to do. At this early stage, that a
theorem follows from the axioms and denitions is ensured by the (possible)
construction of a gure, not `facts of the matter' as to what logically implies
what. However, as rigorisation progresses, the intuitive, conceptual notions are
38 Critique of Pure Reason, A702/B730. Quoted in Toretti (1978), p.227
39 (1998), p.157
40 Both ibid; emphasis in the second quotation is mine.
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supplanted by their formal counterparts|with (in the present day) the limit
case being the embedding of the new system into a set-theoretic metatheory.
Such embedding can be seen as the ultimate way for a mathematical theory to
`explain itself' in terms of its antecedent theories. Nevertheless, the conceptual
remains, to serve as a `motivating' and `heuristic' dimension of the theory|
primarily useful in teaching and in exploring new directions for research. As
emphasised above, intuition was not totally absent from Hilbert's Grundlagen.
As an interesting corollary of these considerations, we can view the gradual
transition from the conceptual to the formal as being the source of the feeling
of mathematical `discovery' which makes nave realism about mathematical ob-
jects such an intuitively attractive conception. Under my alternative, it is not
the properties of timeless non-physical mathematical objects that are `discov-
ered', but rather the facts of the matter as to what formal notions best supplant
the prior, intuitive ones. Such investigation will be subject to pragmatic con-
cerns; for instance there is usually an implicit `principle of minimal disturbance'
dictating that the structural integrity of the theory is paramount. It was long
held that in the postulation of new number systems, the arithmetical prop-
erties (uniqueness of sums, distributivity of multiplication over addition, etc)
must always remain constant. However, in the inclusion in projective geometry
of co-ordinate numbers which square to -1 (which results in the inability to form
the resulting complex number system into an ordered eld) the dictum that all
properties of numbers be held invariant in all number systems is relaxed be-
cause of the proven possibility of elegant new theorems. Instances of the fact
that such theorems can result from the inclusion of such `problematic' concepts
is what can be rightly said to be `discovered' in mathematical investigation.
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1.4 Conclusion
In x1.2 the idea that a new setting can result in conceptual simplication of
a mathematical theory was illustrated by the example of Hilbert's abstract
axiomatisation of geometry. Generally, changes of setting can result in certain
theorems appearing more `natural' when carried out successfully. x1.3 began the
philosophical analysis of this phenomenon, and brought us to an eort to accom-
modate both conceptual continuity of objects and operations between theories
and a regard for mathematical advances as genuine intellectual achievements.
To this end, we recognised a role for an informal, conceptual metalanguage of
mathematics in addition to the formal language(s) used to rigourously express
mathematical theorems. Having reached these conclusions, we found that a
semantic conception of mathematics, where both the conceptual and formal as-
pects of mathematical expression are fragments of natural language, enables us
to both skirt the traditional problems attendant to nave realism and account
for our conclusions regarding the success that certain settings display over oth-
ers. I will now oer an intuitive picture of the conception of mathematical
advancement which our conclusions have led us to.
We begin with a fairly mature mathematical theory, either fully formalised
or well on its way. Nevertheless, certain conjectures seem resistant to proof, or
there are theorems which can be proved but are tediously dicult, sometimes
requiring methods which are counter-intuitive and possess little explanatory
power. A new setting is proposed, for instance one which contains new objects,
or a reorientation toward the subject matter. At this early stage, research is
mainly conducted along the lines provided by the conceptual content of the
intensional view of the theorems and operations of the old system. However, as
this research progresses, the proofs become increasingly formal, as the logical
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investigation of the new setting progresses. When alternative, non-equivalent
formal denitions are proposed, their implications are explored and debate en-
sues over which best ts the intuitive concept being investigated. Eventually,
purely formal rules dictating the relationships between the theorems of the new
setting are proposed, codifying the results of the more informal proofs. As this
progresses, the intuitive aspect plays less and less of a role: the limit case is that
of Hilbert's Grundlagen, where intuition is relegated to heuristic and motiva-
tional purposes only. However, as still being motivational, the intuitive is still
present to provide inspiration and hints at possible directions for new research
in the future.
This perspective has consequences for the history of mathematics. As math-
ematical innovations, especially when they constitute changes of setting, are
required to explain their presence in terms of what has gone before, historical
investigations must be able to give this explanation. Thus the philosophical
position outlined above has broad implications for the project of historical in-
terpretation. In order to fully appreciate both the impact of and motivations
behind a change of setting, we must view it as a historical occurrence, against
a larger backdrop of events. We have seen that the two main aspects of a
mathematical setting are on the one hand conceptual, on the other practical.
It is the business of philosophy to investigate conceptual changes; it is that of
mathematics to investigate formal changes. Investigations of changes should
reect this by seeking to explain changes in formal mathematical systems by
the light of conceptual shifts; however, the current runs both ways|new formal
approaches often inuence shifts in conceptual viewpoints.
With these conclusions established, we can conduct just such an investigation|
of Gottlob Frege, a pioneer in the eld of mathematical logic in the late 19th
century. Frege is known for both his technical and his philosophical innovations,
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which makes him an ideal case study for the kind of historical investigation that
the semantic conception requires. We cannot view Frege's technical innovations
as appearing ex nihilo, for then we have no ability to explain their presence in
terms of providing new solutions to old problems. In order to show that Frege's
contributions to mathematical logic constitute a change of setting, we will have
to identify the motivations arising from concerns of his day. This requires not
only investigating his `philosophical' motivations, and their origins, but being
able to discern evidence of these motivations in technical aspects of his work.
A minor caveat|care must be taken to not confuse the two levels at which
we are working: that of the framework in which we are analysing Frege, and
the analysis itself. I am not going to claim that Frege would have endorsed
the conclusions of this chapter. What I will do is argue that if we view Frege's
work in the context of its time, both in terms of the history of philosophy and
the history of mathematics, then we can see that he is a part of a larger back-
ground; if we take note of this whilst reading Frege, then we can see that he is
responding to his intellectual climate|a reading which will shed new light on
hitherto unexplored aspects of both his philosophy and his mathematical logic.
To successfully perform this kind of historical investigation arms my philo-
sophical position with regard to contemporary philosophy of mathematics: we
can only understand our current settings if we know why they were developed.
Hence, we will rst look at the reasons behind Frege's motivations; this will
be done through an analysis of the relationship between Frege and Kant, the
philosopher he most often credits positively in his work. Once these motivations
have been placed in a context, we will continue investigating how they can
be seen manifesting themselves in his technical innovations|specically, his
formal modeling of certain natural-language phenomena. We shall see that the
many interlinking themes which we explore, encompassing philosophy, logic,
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and history, all come together in exemplifying Frege as a changer of setting.
2. A SETTING FOR FREGE
2.1 Introduction
Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) originally trained as a mathematician, and spent
most of his career teaching mathematics at the University of Jena in his na-
tive Germany. Widely regarded as the pioneer in mathematical logic, his work
is roughly contemporaneous with and responsive to that of Ernst Schroder,
Guiseppe Peano, and George Boole; he wrote several articles detailing the dier-
ences between their respective systems and his own.1 He also published reviews
of works by Hilbert, Cantor, and Husserl. He was (through his work in logic)
a considerable inuence on the logical positivist movement of the early-to-mid
20th century, specically on Rudolf Carnap (a former student) and (the early)
Ludwig Wittgenstein (an erstwhile correspondent). Our main focus will be the
more mature years which produced the Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884) and
the two volumes of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1893/1903), plus several
related articles written in the intervening period. Nevertheless, there are perti-
nent aspects of his rst publication, the Begrisschrift of 1879. The very title
of this work suggests that this is a work in which he sets out his formal notation
1 For instance, `A Critical Elucidation of Some Points in E. Schroeder's Algebra der Logic',
in Geach & Black (eds) (1970), pp.86{106; `Boole's Logical Formula-Language and my
Concept-Script', in Long & White (eds) (1991), `On Herr Peano's Begrisschrift and my
Own', English translation in Australian Journal of Philosophy, 47, p.1-14. He was also tem-
porally contemporaneous with the American logician C.S. Peirce|however, it appears that
they carried out their research independently (cf. Legg [2008], p.213).
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(also known as Begrisschrift, as it translates into English as `ideography' or
`concept-script').2
In order to verify whether Frege's contributions constitute a change of set-
ting, we need to conduct an investigation of Frege's place with respect to an
overall historical background utilising the reections carried out in chapter one.
To this end, we will interlink several aspects of Frege's thought, particularly in
regard to his conception of the problems he was setting out to solve and how
this conception manifests itself in his formal system. Because our aim is also
to locate Frege's innovations within a larger framework of interpreting `changes
of setting' we shall also investigate the interdependencies between the logical
system which is elucidated in the Grundgesetze and his philosophical views and
motivations which are present in all three of his main works (and almost entirely
make up the Grundlagen).
Thus the structure of our investigation will be as follows: x1 one of the
present chapter will be an overview of how I intend to apply the general method-
ology for philosophically interpreting changes of setting which was set forth in
chapter one. This involves consideration of the link between Frege and Kant,
specically with respect to their respective conceptions of mathematics, as this
is the origin of the problems which Frege was seeking to address. Seeing Frege
as concerned more with mathematics than the analytic, and hence not as exer-
cised by Kant's synthetic a priori as many modern readings make out, leads us
to an interesting new way to view Frege's contributions to both mathematics
and philosophy.
2 In what follows, I will cleave to the transliteration (e.g. `In Frege's Begrisschrift, nega-
tion is symbolised by ` A"), with the book referred to as `The Begrisschrift ' (`In the Be-
grisschrift, Frege claims that . . . ').
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We will then progress to an analysis of some technical elements of Frege's
notation, specically with respect to Frege's doctrine of the possibility of `mul-
tiple analyses' of the content of propositions. It will turn out that multiple
analysability is a manifestation of Frege's concern with mathematics over and
above the synthetic a priori, and this is reected in various technical aspects of
Frege's notation which have no counterpart in the logic that was available to
Kant (and indeed, in other respects, in the notation of modern mathematical
logic). The aim is to show that Frege can be viewed as part of a continuum of
progress, both in the spheres of mathematics and philosophy; and this belong-
ing to a larger tradition is what enables us to see Frege as changing the setting
for both the philosophical and mathematical conceptions of arithmetic.
My reasoning is based on considerations of the state of the philosophy
of mathematics at the time. We have, broadly speaking, the following three
schools:
 Transcendental Idealism, descended from Kant
 `Pre-Hilbert' Formalism,3 epitomised in the idea that mathematics is a
game, and has no ontology beyond the physical existence of symbols on
paper, and
 Empiricism, of the variety due to John Stuart Mill. This is the view that
the laws of mathematics are abstracted from empirical experience (i.e. are
a posteriori), and do not obtain prior to it.
In his Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Frege argues forcefully and convincingly
3 As opposed to Hilbert's Formalism|Hilbert's conception of mathematics was in fact
a deeper view than that of the Formalists Frege saw himself as in opposition to. Unless
otherwise noted, `Formalism' always means `pre-Hilbert Formalism'.
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against the last school; his main arguments against the second are given in
the later Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. He makes almost no mention of the
rst. I contend that this is because it was not whether arithmetic is synthetic
or analytic which was his motivation in composing that work and his others|
it was the very Kantian worry about the possibility of alternative systems of
arithmetic.
2.2 Frege, Kant, and the Rational Essentiality of Arithmetic
In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1789), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) ar-
gues that mathematics is a description of the formal qualities which we imbue
things when we perceive them, rather than any description of properties of
those things-in-themselves. This is an elegant explanation of the seemingly un-
reasonable applicability of mathematics|the laws of the mathematical sciences
are descriptions of ourselves (specically, our perceiving faculties) rather than
the objects we perceive. Thus they apply uniformly and a priori to all possible
experience. However, viewing mathematics in this way implies that the systems
of which he was aware (arithmetic, mechanics and Euclidean geometry) are the
only systems which are valid; there are no alternatives.4 The advent of non-
Euclidean geometries, which began with papers by Nikolai Lobachevsky5 and
Janos Bolyai6 and was subsequently endorsed by C.F. Gauss and his student
4 This is due to their being descriptions of the structural nature of our cognitive faculties;
any alternative description must be able to be transformed into one of the three given de-
scriptions. If it cannot, then it is describing something else, and is not applicable to empirical
reality as we see it. Cf. Prolegomena x2: \. . . we must observe that properly mathematical
propositions are always judgments a priori . . . because they carry with them necessity. . . ".
See also Toretti (1978): \For this science [geometry]|as Kant had taught in 1770, and again
in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason and again in the chapter on
pure mathematics in the Prolegomena|was revealed through pure intuition in full agreement
with the Elements of Euclid." (p.33)
5 `On the Principles of Geometry', 1829-30
6 `Appendix Presenting the Absolutely True Science of Space', 1832
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Bernhard Riemann in the mid 1800's,7 greatly undermined Kant's conception.
It became apparent that Euclidean geometry is not the only valid system of
geometry. Now, Frege endorsed Kant's conclusions about geometry|that it is
through some act of intuition that we see Euclidean geometry as valid for our
immediate spatial perceptions8|but he is seen by some authors as denying that
this is the case for arithmetic.9 It is true that he saw arithmetic as analytic,
unlike Kant who stated that it is synthetic. However, I will argue that this is
not a reason for seeing a discontinuity between these two thinkers.
The goal of Frege's logicism is to rule out once and for all the possibility of
alternative systems of arithmetic by proving that arithmetic is a direct conse-
quence of what it is to be rational. Formalism and Empiricism both allow for
the possibility of alternative arithmetics; and Kant's transcendental idealism
cannot rule it out (as illustrated by alternative geometries to that of Euclid).
Frege's argument against Formalism is this: If mathematics is a game of
symbol-manipulation where arithmetical equations are divorced from any con-
tentful notion of meaning, as Formalism asserts, then there is absolutely no
reason intrinsic to arithmetic itself as to why it is one way rather than another.
7 It is true that Gauss had, before the publication of the papes of Bolyai and Lobachevsky,
been working on a non-Euclidean system. However, he refrained from publishing, as he
was wary of how they might be received; upon reading Bolyai's paper he \. . . thereupon
realized that he could spare himself the trouble of writing out his discoveries, for [Bolyai] had
anticipated him." (Toretti [1978], p.53; the letter in which Gauss makes this statement is in
Gauss, WW, vol.8, p.221)
8 See Grundlagen, x14 and x89; also Currie (1982), p.29/30 and pp.75{8
9 For instance, Coa (1991) claims that \Frege's rst book, his Begrisschrift of 1879, put
forth a program that directly opposed Kant. (p.64; emphasis mine). Likewise, \The distance
between Frege and Kant is underscored by the paucity of remarks on that most disturbing of
Kantian problems, the character of the objects of knowledge and their constitution through
the categories [i.e., our epistemic relationship with external objects]. Objects are no problem
for Frege|they are the tables and chairs of everyday experience, the numbers and classes
of mathematical knowledge, the truth tables of his logic, and so on." (p.67). I would argue
that such `paucity', rather than underscoring a `distance' between Frege and Kant, is actually
evidence for a lack of such distance.
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The ultimate consequence of this is Formalism's complete inability to explain
the applicability of arithmetic to physical phenomena:
Why can arithmetical equations be applied? Only because they
express thoughts. How can we possibly apply an equation which ex-
pressed nothing and was nothing more than a group of gures, to be
transformed into another group of gures in accordance with certain
rules? Now, it is the applicability alone which elevates arithmetic
from a game to the rank of a science. So applicability necessarily be-
longs to it. Is it good, then, to exclude from arithmetic what it needs
in order to be a science? (`Frege Against the Formalists' (Grundge-
setze Vol. II xx86-137), x91, in Geach & Black (eds) Translations
from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (1970))
Frege is drawing from the applicability of mathematics as an objection to the
kind of Formalism propounded by E. Heine and J. Thomae (the targets of the
passage quoted). The fact that mathematics is possessed of such applicabil-
ity is evidence of the rst degree against taking it to be a game of symbol-
manipulation; it is the content of mathematics which makes it mathematics. In
this, Frege is in total agreement with Kant.10
The Empiricist view of arithmetic is descended from the denial that mathe-
matics is a priori.11 A well-known proponent is John Stuart Mill (1806{1873);
his writings were the main target of Frege's polemic against the school. Arith-
metic is a posteriori because its laws are observed empirically, and then recog-
nised after the fact. For instance, one abstracts the rule for addition from
10 Kant's reasons for arguing that mathematics describes formal properties of our experience
are a direct result of appreciation for its applicability; this is one of the greatest points of
dierence between Kant and earlier philosophers such as David Hume.
11 And thus not necessary.
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repeated experiences of combining separate collections of objects (much as one
abstracts the concept `dog' from repeated interactions with dogs). Frege char-
acterises such a view of arithmetic as about \. . . piles of pebbles and ginger-
snaps. . . "12 rather than about number.
If mathematics is abstracted from experience (and is hence neither a priori
nor necessary), then there is no reason why we can rationally assume that we
will never come across an experience which falsies a law of arithmetic. Frege
thinks that this is manifestly impossible; a statement of arithmetic cannot be
falsied:
[H]e [Mill] holds that the identity 1 = 1 could be false, on the ground
that one pound weight does not always weigh precisely the same as
another. But the proposition 1 = 1 is not intended in the least to
state that it does. (Grundlagen, x9)
The main confusion that Empiricists fall into is confusing the priority of state-
ments of arithmetic with that of their applications. \Mill always confuses the
applications that can be made of an arithmetical proposition, which are often
physical and do presuppose observed facts, with the pure mathematical propo-
sition itself."13 Thus it is merely the applications of an arithmetical statement
which depend on experience|not the truth of the proposition itself; this truth
is above falsication. Once again, Frege is guided in his philosophy by an ap-
propriate appreciation of the applicability of mathematics and its implications;
and the tone of this appreciation is reminiscent of Kant.
The case with Transcendental Idealism is somewhat dierent. Because Kant
12 Grundlagen, x27
13 Ibid., x9; emphasis mine
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saw the reason for the way arithmetic is in the structure of our perceptual ap-
paratus, there is no guarantee that alternative systems cannot exist. It is, how-
ever, supposedly certain that we are incapable of conceiving of such systems|
nevertheless this was also assumed to be the case with geometry until it was
shown otherwise by the work of Bolyai and Lobachevsky. Thus, Frege sought
assurance against the same happening in arithmetic in a source deeper than
the anthro-specic nature of our perceptual apparatus|the very nature of ra-
tionality itself. If successful, he would have shown that so-called `alternative'
arithmetics could only have been carried out by fundamentally irrational be-
ings; and as such, would have no claim to the title of `arithmetic' at all. I will
argue in what follows that this was Frege's goal, and that his statement that
arithmetic is analytic was simply the best way to do this. Indeed, Frege ends his
Grundlagen with the statement that \From all the preceding it thus emerged
as a very probable conclusion that the truths of arithmetic are analytic and a
priori; we achieved an improvement [as opposed to a refutation] on the view of
Kant."14
2.2.1 Kant's Conception of Mathematical Knowledge
In x87 of the Grundlagen, Frege makes the curious statement that
The laws of number...are not really applicable to external things;
they are not the laws of nature. What they do apply to are judge-
ments about things in the external world: they are the laws of the
laws of nature. They do not assert connexions between phenom-
ena, but connexions between judgements; and among judgements
14 Ibid., x109; emphasis mine.
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are included the laws of nature.
There is a lot of content in this passage. Frege is saying that the `laws of number'
are not properties of external objects|rather, they govern what we are able to
assert about such objects. Such a view is very close to that articulated by Kant
almost a century earlier.15
Kant claimed that the mathematical sciences, construed by him to be ex-
haustively described as geometry, mechanics and arithmetic nd their epistemic
and metaphysical basis (i.e. why we believe them to be true, and what they
actually say, respectively) in the `pure forms of intuition'. Forms of intuition are
the framework(s) that all of empirical experience is necessarily located within
and restricted to. Geometry, for its part, is the description of space (the outer
form of intuition)|which is to say, all human experience of outer objects takes
place in space, and thus obeys the laws of (Euclidean) geometry. Arithmetic is
the description of our pure form of inner intuition|time:
[T]he intuitions which pure mathematics lays at the foundations of
all its cognitions and judgments which appear at once apodeictic
and necessary are space and time. . . Geometry is based on the pure
intuition of space. Arithmetic attains its concepts of numbers by the
successive addition of units of time, and pure mechanics especially
can attain its concept of motion only by employing the representa-
tion of time. (Prolegomena x10)
In parallel with the case of space, all our experiences (regardless of whether
they are of objects outside or within us [such as thoughts]) take place within
15 See Prolegomena xx11 & 12
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time, which is to say, they are ordered with respect to temporal progression.
Because we human beings can only experience outer objects as being spaced,
and must experience every object as being temporal, we are entitled to infer that
propositions regarding the forms themselves of inner and outer intuition (space
and time, thus geometric and arithmetical propositions) are both necessary and
a priori. Kant supplies many arguments for the idea that space is an original
condition of our ability to perceive outer objects, and cannot be abstracted from
those experiences after the fact. For instance:
We can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though
we can quite well think it as empty of objects. It must therefore be
regarded as a condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as
a determination dependant upon them. It is an a priori represen-
tation, which necessarily underlies outer appearances. (Critique of
Pure Reason, A24/B39)
It is important to notice that Kant takes space as `imposed' upon reality by our
act of perceiving|it is this mediating nature which allows us to regard space
as applying in the same way to all human experiences, be they past, future, or
even possible experiences which are never actualised:
If our intuition [i.e. perception] had to be of such a nature that it
represented things as they are in themselves, no intuition a priori
would ever take place and intuition would be empirical every time.
(Prolegomena x9)
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Thus, it is the mediating nature of space|the fact that all experiences of outer
phenomena are spatial experiences|which gives geometry, the science of de-
scribing the structure of space, its a priority and necessity. Similar arguments
are given for the case of time and its acting as the basis for arithmetic; however,
as the argument for space being a pure form of intuition is given rst, and Kant
claims that the two arguments are very similar, he gives only brief considera-
tion to that which as to become Frege's main concern. Nevertheless, there are
striking similarities between the doctrine of space and time as a pure forms of
intuition and the idea that the laws of arithmetic are the `laws of the laws of
nature'.
2.2.2 Frege's Transcendental Idealism
The laws of nature are, for Frege, judgements; and the laws of arithmetic apply
to all judgements. This is why they cannot be negated|for doing so would rob
one of the ability to even think:
[W]e have only to try denying one of [the laws of arithmetic], and
complete confusion ensues. Even to think at all seems no longer
possible. The basis of arithmetic lies deeper, it seems, than any
of the empirical sciences...The truths of arithmetic govern all that
is numerable. This is the widest domain of all; for to it belongs
not only the existent...but everything thinkable. Should the laws
of number, then, be connected very intimately with the laws of
thought? (Grundlagen x14)
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A more forceful statement of Frege's logicism would be hard to nd. Frege is
describing (among other things) his attitude toward the question of the appli-
cability of the laws of arithmetic. `The truths of arithmetic govern all that is
numerable'|and everything that can be experienced is numerable. This is a
point of intersection with Kant's attitude, because for Kant everything that can
be experienced is also subject to the laws of arithmetic. However, the respec-
tive reasons which motivate the claims of Kant and Frege dier in an important
respect, and we shall see that this dierence is the source of the reason why
Frege thinks he is entitled to make a claim about the applicability of the laws
of arithmetic which is a lot stronger than that made by Kant. This stronger
claim, in turn, implies the impossibility of any system of arithmetic which is
not equivalent to our one.
Kant believes that the universal (empirical) applicability of arithmetic lies
in its basis on time as a pure form of intuition, plus the fact that everything
empirical is experienced temporally. Thus the applicability of arithmetic is a
consequence of of the structure of the way the (human) mind interprets sense
experience. For instance:
[T]he dierence between similar and equal things which are not con-
gruent (for instance, helices winding in opposite ways) cannot be
made intelligible by any concept, but only by relation to the left
and right hands, which immediately refers to intuition. (Prolegom-
ena x13)
Now, because all our knowledge is derived from intuitions (be it via their content
as sense impressions, or their formal qualities as being spatiotemporal) our
cognitive apparatus is very intimately linked with that of the senses: \it is only
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the form of sensuous intuition by which we can intuit things a priori".16 For
Kant, both the epistemic and metaphysical aspects of items of knowledge are
interdependently consequent of the structure of our senses and minds. That is
to say, the contingent fact-of-the-matter of how we come to know something|
the context of discovery, or epistemic aspect|cannot be fully separated from
the necessary facts|the context of justication, or metaphysical aspect|of why
we think that something is true.
Frege's attitude is somewhat dierent. For him, the epistemic and the meta-
physical are to be kept as separate as possible:
In general...we should separate the problem of how we arrive at the
content of a judgement from the problem of how its assertion is to
be justied...When a proposition is called analytic or a posteriori
in my sense, this is not a judgement about the conditions, psycho-
logical, physiological and physical, which have made it possible to
form the content of the proposition in our consciousness; nor is it a
judgement about the way in which some other man has come, per-
haps erroneously, to believe it true; rather, it is a judgement about
the ultimate ground upon which rests the justication for holding it
to be true. (Grundlagen x3)
Thus the universal applicability of arithmetic lies not in how we arrive at its
content|i.e. its relation to intuition|but in why we think that the content
is accurate. In fact, Frege even identies how content is arrived at with the
psychological:
16 Prolegomena x10
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[E]ven mathematical textbooks do at times lapse into psychology.
When the author feels himself obliged to give a denition, yet can-
not, then he tends to at least give a description of the way in which
we arrive at the object or concept concerned. These cases can be eas-
ily recognised by the fact that such explanations are never referred
to again in the course of the exposition. (Grundlagen, Introduction,
p.VIIIe)
Thus it can be seen that Frege considered the contingent fact of the matter as to
how content is arrived at to be irrelevant to the justiability of the assertion of
the proposition in question. He is taking the distinction made above, between
the context of discovery and the context of justication, and forcing the two
apart. Frege's project, the aim of his logicism, is to nd all that is needed
for the justication of the laws of arithmetic in that which is constitutive of
what he termed the `laws of thought'. And by `laws of thought', Frege means
something more wide-ranging than what the phrase might mean from Kant's
pen. Kant admits that while his justications for the possibility of synthetic a
priori knowledge are based on pure forms of intuition, these pure forms only
apply to creatures the structure of whose minds bear the same relationship
between the cognitive and the sense-experiential as ours do. A creature that
does not have left and right hands could not have the same justication for the
judgment that `two gures are equal though not congruent' that we do.17 He
concedes that a being with mind capable of a dierent relationship to the objects
of experience could know things by other methods than we do; the standard
example being God, for whom knowledge of the noumenal18 is possible and thus
whose power of intuition far surpasses ours.19
17 Prolegomena x12
18 Thing-in-itself; that which causes sensory perceptions
19 By proceeding directly from the understanding, rather than standing as a prior condition
for it. Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, A250
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In holding that the laws of arithmetic are implied by what it is to think,
simpliciter, Frege is entitled to claim that any being which is to be regarded as
rational is to be bound by the laws of arithmetic.20 Thus even a being whose
powers of intuition far surpassed our own and whose knowledge far outstripped
what we are even capable of, would still justify the laws of arithmetic in the
same way that we do, by appeal to the same concepts. This is not to deny
that such a being may come to believe arithmetical propositions in a dierent
manner to us|it may arrive at `2 + 3 = 5' or `a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c'
originally via the laws of second-order predicate logic (i.e. analytically), whereas
we originally arrive at the proposition by counting objects and putting them
into heaps (synthetically)|the nature of the ultimate justication for asserting
such that such a proposition holds for all objects is to be found in the notion
that it is implied by the nature of the laws of thought. That is to say, it
can be justiably asserted because it is analytic; this analyticity is what saves
arithmetic from the Kantian worry that other systems of arithmetic may be
possible, a la non-Euclidean geometries.
From here, it is a short step to the notion that all justiably assertible propo-
sitions must not contradict any analytic proposition. No empirical observation
is to be counted as contradicting a statement of logic over and above its simply
being a bad observation.21 Hence the idea that the laws of arithmetic are the
`laws of the laws of nature'. In performing the scientic investigations which (if
successful) ultimately yield what Frege termed `laws of nature', we must always
respect the laws of arithmetic, which are (for Frege) covertly disguised laws of
logic|which are in turn simply the laws of rational thought. To not do this
is to risk losing the ability to be considered coherently thinking at all. Frege's
20 Notice that it is agents (i.e. rational beings) which are bound by the laws of arithmetic,
and not external objects. This is one instance of contact between the philosophies of Frege
and Kant.
21 A Quinean point.
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logicism has come full circle, from the starting-point of a desire to take the laws
of arithmetic as transcendentally ideal, and thus prior to experience (contra
Formalism and Empiricism) but guard them against the possibility of plurality,
as befell Kant's philosophy of geometry, to a framework in which to place all
rational discourse|the language of the laws of thought themselves.
Thus, we can see that Frege saw himself as extending the Kantian frame-
work, rather than seeking to overthrow or simply disregard it. His `enlarging'
of the purview of the analytic was an attempt to extend the Kantian conclusion
that the laws of arithmetic are justied by the structural nature of our minds
to apply to any rational mind whatsoever, and thus safeguard against the pos-
sibility of non-equivalent alternatives. In doing so, he has had to separate the
sense-experiential and cognitive aspects of thought to a greater extent than that
of Kant. This in turn leads Frege to place greater emphasis on the ultimate
grounds for the justication of our knowledge, over and above the contingent
facts surrounding how it is that we come to know/believe the content of that
knowledge. However, such an interpretation would seem to leave, through its
de-emphasis on the epistemic aspects of mathematical knowledge, little room
for considerations of the role of practice in the founding of such knowledge. We
shall see that in actual fact, Frege left plenty of room for such consideration,
but he shifted the constitutive aspects from the conceptual to the practical
domain|through the innovations presented in his formulation of a Begriss-
chrift, or `concept-script'. It was these innovations which led him to believe that
he had found the resources to found arithmetical judgements in logic, the laws
of thought, and enabled him to draw the stronger conclusion just discussed. It
is to these practical aspects of Frege's thought to which we now turn.
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2.3 Logic and Judgement
So, what is the source of Frege's condence that he had in fact found an ad-
equate re-orientation of the analytic, one which enabled him to revise Kant's
conclusion that arithmetic is synthetic? A key point is that, according to our
previous conclusion, Frege saw himself as extending the Kantian framework
rather than refuting it. Following this train of thought, I contend that Frege
relocated the `denition' of the analytic/synthetic distinction to the realm of
the practical, and this is what enabled him to perform his logicist extensions.
This centers on the idea that for Kant, the distinction between analytic and
synthetic knowledge is discursive, i.e. verbally stated|and thus rmly within
the bounds of philosophy. Frege, however, was able to show rather than `say'
the distinction, via his powerful technical innovation, his Begrisschrift. Hence
Frege does not merely dene the conditions that a statement must full in or-
der to be considered analytic, nor a list of checks that will verify the presence
of such conditions; he shows how an analytic construction of such statements
should be able to be performed. Consider the following statement from the
Grundlagen:
Kant obviously|as a result, no doubt, of dening them too narrowly|
underestimated the value of analytic judgements, though it seems
that he did have some inkling of the wider sense in which I have
used the term. . . He seems to think of concepts as dened by giving
a simple list of characteristics in no special order; but of all ways of
forming concepts, this is one of the least fruitful. . . .What we nd
in [the denitions in mathematics] is not a simple list of character-
istics; every element of the denition is intimately, I might almost
say organically, connected with all the rest. (x88)
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Frege is seeking to give a characterisation of mathematical concepts which is
able to capture this `organic' relatedness, rather than merely `dening' them
by stipulation. I conjecture that it is in Frege's Begrisschrift itself, his formal
language and the use it is put to, that we nd evidence for the idea that Frege
is able to nd a Kantian argument that arithmetic will brook no alternative.
Of considerable importance is the well-known fact that Frege's Begrisschrift
is a far more powerful logical system than that Kant had at his disposal. Kant
had the Aristotelian syllogism, supplemented with a theory of hypothetical and
disjunctive propositions.22 Frege, on the other hand, had full second-order
polyadic logic. One example of the mathematical poverty of the syllogism is
that it contains only one-place predicates. Predicates with two or more places
(`relations') are required to formalise many mathematical phenomena, such as
the denition of a dense ordering:
8x8y(x < y ! 9z(x < z ^ z < y))
The relation `<' is two-place, in that it relates two variables (as in x < y). The
above statement says that given any x which stands in the relation < to any
y, then there exists a z which also stands in that relation ('is between') both x
and y. This process can, in principle, be iterated an innite number of times.
Such an iteration would result in the proven existence of an innite number
of points. Friedman (1992) notes that in a logic of only one-place predicates,
the possibility (in principle) of proving the existence of an innite number of
objects is conspicuously absent:
A central dierence between monadic logic and full polyadic logic is
that the latter can generate an innity of objects while the former
cannot. . . Proof-theoretically, therefore, if we carry out deductions
22 MacFarlane (2002), p.26
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from a given theory using only monadic logic, we will be able to
prove the existence of at most 2k distinct objects: after a given
nite point we will run out of \provably new" individual constants.
(Kant and the Exact Sciences, p.59)
We need two-place predicates in order to be able to construct new objects in
innite quantities. It is exactly this kind of access that we need if we wish
to have dense orderings; if we can iterate the process of logically constructing
them only a nite number of times, then our ordering will have `gaps' (and thus
no longer be dense). In syllogistic form, an attempted construction takes this
form:
P.1. Every pair of rational numbers is a pair of rational numbers with a
rational number between them.
P.2. hA;Bi is a pair of rational numbers.
) C. hA;Bi is a pair of rational numbers with a rational number between
them.
Here we have a pair of premises and a conclusion which together contain only
two (one-place predicates): `is a pair of rational numbers' and `has a ratio-
nal number between them'. It is obvious from the language used to express
these predicates that they apply to pairs of objects, and hence are in a way `at-
tempting' to be polyadic predicates; nevertheless the machinery of the syllogism
compels us to view the required pairs as individual objects. Also, as there are
only two predicates, according to Friedman the largest number of new constants
(i.e. objects) which can be constructed is 22 = 4! Surely, we need more than a
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total of 5 pairs-of-rational-numbers-with-a-rational-between-them if we are to
have a dense ordering. In syllogistic logic there is no way to proceed from the
assertion that `hA;Bi is a pair of rational numbers with some rational number
between them' to claim that there exists `some rational number between A and
B', even though we can infer `hA;Bi is a pair of rational numbers with a ratio-
nal number between them'.23 This is because the statement `there is a rational
number between A and B' necessarily splits the single object hA;Bi into two
objects (A and B) and asserts that a third object is in the polyadic relation of
`betweenness' with them.
Syllogistic reasoning proceeds via the classication of parts of the premises
into the major, middle and minor terms. The general form is this:
P:1 All A's are B
P:2 X is an A
)C: X is a B
`A' is the middle term: it is what `connects' P.1. and P.2. in such a way as
to produce C. (`B' is the major term, the predicate of which the minor term
[`X'] is predicated). However, in the (attempted) derivation of the property of
belonging to a dense ordering, the assertion that the rational number between
A and B exists cannot be inferred, because there is no middle term to mediate
the deduction.24 In that example, `A'=`pair of rational numbers', `B'=`a pair
of rational numbers with a rational number between them', and `X'=`hA;Bi' (a
specic pair of rational numbers, conceived as a single object). What is actually
needed in the middle term is `if hA;Bi is a pair of rational numbers with a
rational number between them, then there is a rational number between A and
23 MacFarlane (2002), p.26
24 Ibid.
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B'. However the incorporation of this statement would beg the question|that
there exists a rational between A and B is what we are trying to infer; also, the
splitting of hA;Bi into `A and B' introduces the need for a dyadic (two-place)
predicate, which as we have already seen is not possible in syllogistic logic.
Thus, in order for Kant to think himself justied in asserting the existence of
dense orderings, he would have seen no course but to `model' the concept on
that of an innitely divisible line in space (the kind postulated by Euclid), thus
rendering the judgement synthetic.25 Generally, any inference which involves
polyadic predicates is seen by Kant to rely on intuition, as his conception of
what it is for something to be logical or analytic is restricted to the syllogism.26
In contrast to this situation, Frege was able to utilise his more powerful
logical resources to derive the explicitly existential statement from the stated
premises|without the need for any concepts modelled on experience or recourse
to intuition. In light of the reections of section one, we are to interpret Frege as
merely `shifting the burden' of the foundations of arithmetic to the practical, to
found arithmetic mathematically rather than philosophically. However, this is
not to mean that we should see Frege as endorsing as a foundation for arithmetic
just any formal system capable of supplying the requisite deductions. I contend
that Frege was in fact seeking to characterise the analytic, not merely to model
it in the manner that Kant modelled his concepts on intuited phenomena. This
interpretation will involve two strands. The rst is a notion of an `inferential
correspondence' between a subject matter and the language used to talk about
it; the second is the principle of multiple analysability, embodied in the two-
dimensional, graphical nature of Frege's Begrisschrift notation.
25 Ibid; see also Friedman (1992), p.70/1 for an in-depth discussion.
26 Friedman (1992), p.63: \For Kant logic is of course syllogistic logic or (a fragment of)
what we call monadic logic. Hence for Kant, one cannot represent the innity of points on
a line by a formal theory such as [Hilbert's continuity axioms]. If logic is monadic, one can
only represent such innity intuitively|by an iterative process of spatial construction. . . ".
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2.3.1 Inferential Correspondence
On my re-interpretation, the idea of an `inferential correspondence' between a
subject-matter (i.e., collection of objects) and the language/notation used to
talk about it, is essential to the link between Frege's practical innovation in
the eld of logic and his theoretical contributions to philosophy. This notion of
inferential correspondence links to Frege's idea of what it is for something to
be justied, or justiably assertible; and the notion of justication is vital to
Frege's project, as the preceding reections have borne out.
Consider some eld of natural science. The language used to talk about the
objects and relationships which constitute that eld is comprised, in a simplied
manner, of two things: terms, which are the main ingredient for the forming
of propositions (i.e. assertions about the objects), and rules for inferring new
propositions from those already present. The idea of an isomorphism between
the actual objects being investigated and the language used to talk about them
is an expression of the intuitive notion that the two structures should mirror
each other. When a science is at a mature level of development, one would
hope that an inferential move sanctioned by the language would always (neces-
sarily) be possessed of a structural counterpart in relations between the objects
themselves. Conversely, every structural relationship that exists between ob-
jects should be able to be modelled in the language. Frege hints at such an
idea when, in the Begrisschrift, he notes when discussing Leibniz's notion of
a `calculus rationator ' that \. . . he contemplated the immense increase in the
intellectual power of mankind that a system of notation directly appropriate to
objects themselves would bring about. . . "27 The phrase `directly appropriate to
objects themselves' is telling, for Frege is prioritising the relationships between
27 Preface; emphasis mine.
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objects to our subject-predicate apprehension of them.
In the Grundlagen Frege cautions us against `letting our notation think
for us' without being certain that the notation has a complete inferential cor-
respondence with the subject under study (in the case of Begrisschrift, the
logical form of propositions and mathematical proofs).28 In the Grundgesetze,
he observes how
It is remarkable how an inaccurate manner of speaking or writing,
perhaps originally employed for convenience or brevity but with full
consciousness of its inaccuracy, can end in a confusion of thought
once that consciousness has disappeared. . . Such experiences teach
us how necessary it is to place the highest demands on the accuracy
of a manner of speaking and writing. (x0)
However, as Frege considers himself to have been adequately rigorous in his
formulation of the Begrisschrift, he is entitled to make the claim that any
arithmetical judgement made with the aid of his notation can only be con-
sidered synthetic as an epistemic matter-of-fact; doing so does not aect the
analytic foundation of the judgement29 (one result of this is Frege's methodolog-
ical stipulation that a function give a well-dened output for any well-dened
input). Our reason for believing the judgement to be true (the metaphysical
28 \It is possible, of course, to operate with gures mechanically, just as it is possible to
speak like a parrot; but that hardly deserves the name of thought. It only becomes possible
at all after the mathematical notation has, as a result of genuine thought, been so developed
to that it does the thinking for us, so to speak." Grundlagen, Introduction, p.IV; emphasis
mine.
29 \. . . we divide all truths that require justication into two kinds, those for which the
proof can be carried out purely by means of logic and those for which it must be supported
by facts of experience. But that a proposition is of the rst kind is surely compatible with
the fact that it could nevertheless not have come to consciousness in a human mind without
any activity of the senses." Begrisschrift, Preface.
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foundation which is a consequence of the structure of the rational mind) and
the way in which we come to believe it to be true (the spatial intuitions we
have of Begrisschrift symbols written on a physical page) can be separated in
the way desired by Frege and unavailable to Formalists, Empiricists, and indeed
Kant himself.
Kant cannot separate the metaphysical and epistemically intuitive aspects
of an arithmetical judgement because his logic is inadequate to the task of
modeling the kinds of relations which occur in arithmetic. For example, the
physical world as characterised by Euclidean geometry, is possessed of features
which cannot be appropriately constructed in any manner which Kant would
consider `analytic'. Friedman states that
The idea of innite divisibility or denseness is not capturable by
a formula or sentence [of monadic logic], but only by an intuitive
procedure that is itself dense in the appropriate respect. . . Thus, the
proposition that space is innitely divisible is a priori because its
truth|the existence of an appropriate \model"|is a condition for
its very possibility. (Kant and the Exact Sciences, p.66)
Hence Kant cannot even envision the kind of correspondence between a purely
logical language and (e.g.) Euclidean space which can be given in Frege's en-
hanced logic.30 Likewise, certain arithmetical objects, such as what Frege terms
30 However, Frege agreed with Kant about the synthetic truth of geometry. Nevertheless he
worked in non-Euclidean geometry, regarding it as a logical system rather than a description
of any actual space. Hence he was aware of a distinction between `pure' and `applied' geom-
etry which was unavailable to Kant. Frege considered Euclidean geometry synthetically true
because appeal to intuition is required to accept it as true of actual space over alternative
systems (See Currie (1982), p.33/4). The very presence of alternative systems means that
geometry cannot be analytically true; the opposite is the case for arithmetic.
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`hereditary sequences',31 cannot be captured in a logic which has monadic pred-
icates only. This manifests itself in the way Kant draws the distinction between
mathematics and philosophy. Philosophy is discursive, as shown by its analytic
method of dissection of concepts, whereas mathematics is intuitive, or construc-
tive, in that it relies on a constitutive role for intuition in progressing from one
mathematical statement to another:
[W]e nd that all mathematical cognition has this peculiarity: it
must rst exhibit its concept in intuition, and do so a priori, in
an intuition that it not empirical but pure. Without this math-
ematics cannot take a single step; hence its judgments are always
intuitive; whereas philosophy must be satised with discursive judg-
ments from mere concepts, and though it may illustrate its apodeic-
tic [absolutely certain] doctrines through intuition, can never derive
them from it. (Prolegomena, x7)
Frege's innovation was the realisation that the epistemic aspect of a judgment
can be catered for by the practical tool of Begrisschrift, whereas the theoret-
ical aspect and its link to the structure of a language or notation are rmly
metaphysical aairs. In other words, we know that any inference successfully
made in Begrisschrift is indeed a syntactic counterpart of a logical connection
that does obtain. By using a symbolism which makes aspects of logical form
and inference such as quantication and polyadic predication syntactically per-
spicuous, rather than at the level of (discursive) concepts, a practical aspect of
the nature of judging|the move from a judgement to a consequence of that
judgement|is being relegated to the fully epistemic nature of the judgement
31 See Begrisschrift x23, Grundgesetze x45; an illuminating discussion of whether `following
in a series' is a synthetic property occurs in Boolos (1985) `Reading the Begrisschrift ',
reprinted in Frege's Philosophy of Mathematics Demopoulos (ed), (1995); pp.163{179.
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(the symbolism), rather than being mixed in with the metaphysical and its se-
mantically constitutive role (the content). For example, the use of a rigorously
formulated logical language (one which can `do our thinking for us') frees us
from the restriction that we be able to comprehend a proof in a single step. We
can move from one step to another, safe in the knowledge that we are making
only deductively sound transitions: \Its rst purpose, therefore, is to provide us
with the most reliable test of the validity of a chain of inferences and to point
out every presupposition that tries to sneak in unnoticed. . . ".32 The need for
an intuitive manner to apprehend information can be divorced from playing a
constitutive role in the content of that information; in a well-thought out sym-
bolism, this is done in such a way as to pre-ensure the relation of inferential
correspondence. We may let our notation think for us, if its structure is `the
result of genuine thought'.
Thus, we can interpret Frege's logicism as an attempt at a `rational recon-
struction' of the laws of arithmetic, in such a way as to show that they are
derivable from the resources of his Begrisschrift without the constitutive aid
of any synthetic judgement. The basic laws and rules of inference of Frege's
system were selected for their self-evidence; they were intended be such that
even someone who thought that arithmetic was synthetic would still accept the
basic laws as analytic. Anyone who rejected the derivation of arithmetic from
those basic laws would be, in Frege's eyes, irrational.
32 Begrisschrift, Preface
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2.3.2 The Principle of Multiple Analysability
I will now argue that Frege's notion of multiple analysability and its relation
to one of Frege's better-known contributions to the philosophy of language, the
context principle33, are the result of his attempt to `improve on the view of
Kant'. Because the doctrine of multiple analysability is the lesser-known, I will
begin with its explication, reserving the context principle for afterwards.
There is some amount of textual evidence for the fact that Frege held view
that propositions are possessed of many dierent possibilities regarding what
exactly they say; however, the main source of justication for this claim is to
be found in the Begrisschrift notation itself, and will be the subject of the
next section. The main focus of the current discussion is textual evidence and
its implications for Frege's philosophy as a whole. For instance, in x46 of the
Grundlagen, Frege observes that
While looking at one and the same phenomenon, I can say with equal
truth both \It is a copse" and \It is ve trees", or both \Here are
four companies" and \Here are 500 men". Now what changes here
from one judgement to to another is neither any individual object,
nor the whole, the agglomeration of them, but only my terminology.
But that is itself only a sign that one concept has been substituted
for another.
This is a fairly straightforward statement of what I shall term Frege's doctrine of
`multiple analysability'. It is, broadly speaking, the idea that analysis of a state
33 The other well known contribution being the distinction between Sense and Reference;
see chapter three, x3.2.4
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of aairs is prior to any assertion of that state of aairs's being true. According
to the above quote, this doctrine holds for what may be termed `unanalysed'
states of aairs; situations where one is yet to formulate a propositional de-
scription. However, Frege also holds that the doctrine applies to descriptions
of situations:
The judgement \line a is parallel to line b", or, using symbols,
a==b
can be taken as an identity. If we do this, we obtain the concept
of direction, and say: \the direction of line a is identical with the
direction of line b". Thus we replace the symbol == by the more
generic symbol =, through removing what is specic in the content
of the former and dividing it between a and b. We carve up the
content in a way dierent from the original way, and this yields us
a new concept. (Grundlagen, x64 [my emphasis])
The idea here is that given a proposition, one can analyse it into dierent
concepts and/or objects. This has anities with Frege's statements in the
Begrisschrift, where he emphasises that in (what could broadly be termed)
his `embryonic philosophy of language', he is taking the notions of function and
argument as prior to those of subject and predicate.
A distinction between subject and predicate does not occur in my
way of representing a judgement...[T]he contents of two judgements
may dier in two ways: either the consequences derivable from the
rst, when it is combined with certain other judgements, always
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follow from the second, when it is combined with these same judge-
ments, [and conversely,]34 or this is not the case. (Begrisschrift,
x3)
Frege is talking about propositions where the subject and predicate can be
interchanged, as in the case of `The A has property P' versus `The property P
is instantiated by A'. Frege gives the following example:
The two propositions \The Greeks defeated the Persians at Plataea"
and \The Persians were defeated by the Greeks at Plataea" dier
in the rst way [that the contents of either can be derived from
the other]...Now I call that part of the content that is the same
in both the conceptual content. Since it alone is of signicance
to our ideography, we need not introduce any distinction between
propositions having the same conceptual content. (Ibid.)
Thus, the symbolising of relations in the Begrisschrift takes place at a higher
level than that of the subject-predicate form, as found in ordinary language
(and the syllogism). The two objects a and b are related by R; hance we can
equivalently say either that a R's b or that b is being R'd by a | in the former
case, b is predicated with the property of being R'd by a, whereas in the latter
a has the feature of being R'd by b. The two analyses are equivalent, however
they yield dierent objects and predicates in each case. The statement has
multiple analyses.
Indeed, Frege believed that natural language merely symbolises the various
states of aairs regarding objects being related to one another, and incompletely
34 Insertion original to translation.
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at that. The statement `All whales are mammals',35 in its natural language
form, looks like a statement about the subject, all whales. But, for Frege, it is
not in fact about whales but about a concept :
As a general principle, it is impossible to speak of an object without
in some way designating or naming it; but the word \whale" is not
a name for any individual creature. If it be replied that what we
are speaking of is not, indeed, an individual denite object, but
nevertheless an indenite object, I suspect that \indenite object"
is only another term for concept, and a poorer, more contradictory
one at that. (Grundlagen, x47)36
He reads this as `take anything; if it is a whale, it is a mammal' which equates
with the rst-order sentence 8x(Wx!Mx). On this reading, we nd that the
sentence is not `about' whales per se, but rather is about the concept `all whales',
and states that any object falling under the concept `whale' also falls under the
concept `mammal'. Thus, the sentence is stating that the two concepts `whale'
and `mammal' stand in a certain (second-order) relation, namely that which
Frege calls `subsumption'.37 The concept `whale' is `contained' in the concept
`mammal'.
However, in Begrisschrift, many sentences are capable of multiple analy-
ses which are equivalent in terms of truth-conditions, though this may not be
immediately obvious in natural language form or in modern notation. In order
to appreciate this, we will have to familiarise ourselves with the Begrisschrift
35 see Grundlagen x47
36 Further discussion of Frege's attitude toward `indenite objects' will take place in chapter
three, x3.2.5
37 See Macbeth (2005), p.104 and Grundgesteze x22
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notation. At this stage, we will concentrate on two main features: interchange-
ability of subcomponents, and contraposition.
2.3.3 Interchangeability of Subcomponents
In the `Exposition of the Begrisschrift', which comprises the rst technical
section of Frege's Grundgeseze der Arithmetik, Frege details how one can, in
his Begrisschrift or concept-script, freely alter the order of premises in an
inference (`subcomponents'). For Frege, there is one main form of inference,
of which any other (for instance, the traditional forms of argument associated
with the method of Aristotelian syllogism) can be built up from. This form of
inference Frege writes as38


which is a function \...that [takes] its value [to] be the False if the True be taken
as -argument and any object other than the True be taken as -argument, and
that in all other cases the value of the function shall be the True."39 Not
surprisingly, Frege calls the vertical component of this symbol the `condition-
stroke'; indeed, Frege's explanation of it in the earlier Begrisschrift of 1879
makes out its similarities to our modern `A! B' even clearer:
If A and B stand for contents that can become judgments (x240),
there are the following four possibilities:
(1) A is armed and B is armed;
38 See Grundgesetze x12
39 Ibid.
40 [Of the Begrisschrift ]
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(2) A is armed and B is denied;
(3) A is denied and B is armed;
(4) A is denied and B is denied.
Now
A
B
stands for the judgment that the third of these possibilities does not
take place, but one of the other three does.(Begrisschrift x5)
Clearly, Frege has described his `condition-stroke' in a manner which makes
the truth-conditions of ` A
B
' identical to those of `A ! B'. They are
both false only in the case where A is true and B is false. In the Grundgesetze,
after introducing his condition-stroke, Frege goes on to describe a property of
his system which he terms the `interchangeability of subcomponents'. In a
condition-stroke, the order of the premises is immaterial. While this makes no
dierence in the cases described above (there can only be one subcomponent),
if we take as the -argument the statement ` 

', then the following
formula is obtained:



Now, as this statement is false only when  is true,  is true, and  is false,
the order of  and  in the statement does not eect the resultant truth-value.
Frege describes this situation thus:
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


is the False if  and  are the True while  is not the True; in all
other cases it is the True. From this there follows the interchange-
ability of  and ;



is the same truth-value as


:(Grundgesetze x12)
Thus we can see that a four-term statement has, via the interchangeability
of subcomponents, many dierent ways of being expressed. For instance, the
thought embodied in
D
C
B
A
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can be expressed as it is, or as D
A
C
B
, or as D
A
B
C
, or as D
C
A
B
without altering the truth-conditions of the statement. And, as Frege held that
formal dierence in the expression of a thought does not aect its content,41
interchangeability of subcomponents is an instance of multiple analysability.
2.3.4 Contraposition
In Frege's concept-script it is possible to alter the order of premises in an in-
ference without alteration of the content, i.e. the thought embodied in the
proposition. However, it is also possible to change the position of the conclu-
sion with a similar (non-)eect on the content of the proposition. This is done
with the help of the negation sign (` '); it is the better-known technique of
contraposition.
In modern logic, it can easily be shown that P ! Q ` :Q ! :P . This is
merely a rened way of stating the argument form of `Modus Tollendo Tollens',
known since scholastic times. In the Grundgesetze, Frege states that

 
is the False if   is the True and  is not the True;
i.e., if   is the False and  is the True. But the same holds
41 Cf. MacBeth (2005), p.55: \[S]uch transitions are not acts of reason which that take one
from one thought to another, but only transitions from a thought in one form to that thought
in another form."
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for  

; thus the functions 

and 

al-
ways have the same value for the same arguments.. . . The functions


and 

also have the same value for the same
arguments. Thus we may pass from the proposition \  

"
to the proposition \ 
 
" and conversely.. . .A subcomponent
may be interchanged with the main component if the truth-value of
each is simultaneously reversed. This transition we call contraposi-
tion. (x15)
For example, consider the proposition D
C
B
A
discussed above. There we
gave four possible equivalent analyses of the logical relationships between the
premsisesA, B and C and the conclusion D which are embodied by this proposi-
tion. With our new tool of contraposition, we can add many more; too many to
list here. There are many dierent ways to do this; one can merely interchange
the order of the premises, as in C
D
B
A
. One can also `isolate' a group of
68 2. A Setting for Frege
terms into a subcomponent and then contrapose, as in B
D
C
A
. It should
be clear that through repeated iterations of this process, we can make any se-
lection of the premises and/or conclusion into a subcomponent; we can then
place the various components in any order we wish (provided we insert/remove
the appropriate negation symbols). That the techniques of interchanging sub-
components and contraposition are for Frege rules of inference, rather than
axioms|such techniques are processes which take us from a thought in one
form to the same thought in another form|lends to a greater generality of
application than analogous techniques in modern systems. In order to further
explicate this dierence, we shall now compare some proofs in Frege's notation
with how the same proof would be carried out in a modern natural deduction
systems.
2.3.5 Comparing Proofs in Begrisschrift and Natural Deduction
First of all, we we will look at a proof of a contraposition similar to those
described in the previous section (using an ordinary natural deduction-style
system).
Theorem: P ! (Q! (R! S)) ` P ! (:(R! S)! :Q)
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Proof
(1) 1: P ! (Q! (R! S)) [Assumption]
(2) 2: P [A.]
(1; 2) 3: Q! (R! S) [1; 2; Modus Ponens]
(4) 4: Q [A.]
(1; 2; 4) 5: R! S [5; 4; M.P.]
(6) 6: :(R! S) [A.]
(1; 2; 4; 6) 7: (R! S) ^ :(R! S) [5; 6;^-introduction]
(1; 2; 6) 8: :Q [7;Reductio ad Absurdum]
(1; 2) 9: :(R! S)! :Q [6; 8; Conditional Proof]
(1) 10: P ! (:(R! S)! :Q) [2; 9; C.P.]
As we can see, this is a 10-line proof that involves making four assumptions
(three not counting the premise), two uses of conditional proof, and one use of
proof by contradiction. In Frege's symbolism, this proof can be carried out in
two steps. The rst involves analysing the proposition into components, and
the second invokes the contraposition rule. Observe:
S
R
Q
P
We analyse this into three components thus
P
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Q
S
R
We now contrapose the Q and S
R
, taking care to insert a ` ' in front
of them when performing the contraposition, yielding
Q
S
R
P
which is rendered into modern notation as P ! :((R! S)! :Q), the desired
formula. Also, by interchangeability of subcomponents, we can transform our
proposition into
S
Q
R
P
which is equivalent to P ! (R ! (Q ! S). An application of contraposition
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to ` S
Q
' yields ` Q
S
'; and our proposition becomes
Q
S
R
P
Via another change of order of subcomponents, we have
Q
R
S
P
We can see that the Begrisschrift equivalent of P ! (Q! (R ! S)) ` P !
(:S ! (R ! :Q)) takes four steps. The Natural Deduction proof is slightly
more complicated than that of the example given above; it is thirteen lines long,
and requires four assumptions (not counting the initial premise), three uses of
conditional proof, and one reductio ad absurdum. Furthermore, it would seem
that there is, in general, no modern counterpart to Frege's interchangeability of
subcomponents. Whilst it is intuitively obvious, and thus can be proven in each
case, that the order of antecedents in a conditional statement is immaterial to
its validity, it cannot be formulated as a general rule (at least not in the natural
deduction system we are working with). This is because natural deduction
systems work with what may be termed `individual' components, such as P !
Q, rather than whole statements. When it comes to statements with only two
terms, such as P ! Q, the order of premises is important. Frege acknowledges
this, supplying the rule of contraposition to deal with interchanging antecedents
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and consequents. However, in modern systems, the `P ! Q' in `P ! Q', in
`P ! (Q! (R! S))', and in `:S ! (P ! (Q! R))' behave dierently. The
order of terms cannot be altered in the former; likewise, it cannot be altered
in the latter in a manner characterised by a general rule|even though a proof
specic to the proposition involved can be given to show that the order can
be altered. The point is that the proofs of P ! (Q ! R) ` Q ! (P ! R)
and P ! (Q ! (R ! S)) ` Q ! (P ! (R ! S)) will look dierent, and be
specic to the propositions in question, even though there seems to be a general
principle at work.
In Frege's system, the situation is exactly the opposite. While the order
of terms in ` Q
P
' is important, and can only be altered with the aid of
negation symbols (i.e. via contraposition), when it comes to a more complex
statements such as ` S
R
P
' we can freely interchange the antecedents, as
noted above.42 This holds no matter what terms are substituted for `P ', `Q' or
`R', even if these are complex formulae|the same rule holds; all such proofs will
be similar, both in terms of rules invoked and in appearance. This is because
Frege's system seems to be more focussed on the `form' of an inference, rather
than its specic content. This is shown by Frege's employment of rules which
are based purely on the form of an inference, such as the interchangeability of
subcomponents rule; it is also shown by the fact that these rules can be applied
similarly to statements with dierent numbers of terms|which is denitely not
the case in modern natural deduction systems, as evidenced above. This form-
over-content approach, in the most formal of endeavours, formal logic, can be
42 See Grundgesetze x12
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taken as evidence that Frege was bearing a form/content distinction reminiscent
of Kant's when designing his notational system.
These two rules, interchangeability of subcomponents and contraposition,
are both examples of Frege's principle of multiple analysability manifesting itself
in technical aspects of his system. This is evidenced by the fact that the use they
are put to has no easy counterpart in modern systems. Also serving as evidence
is the way that they are applied to whole propositions rather than specic
components, unlike the rules of inference found in modern natural deduction
systems. However, in order to investigate the connection with Kant, we must
now view Frege's context principle in terms of multiple analysability.
2.3.6 The Context Principle (In Context)
Frege's most forward statement of the context principle occurs at the beginning
of the Grundlagen, when he is outlining his methodology:
[I have resolved] never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation,
but only in the context of a proposition. . . (Introduction, p.X)
The principle also manifests itself in a form that iterates to the level of the
relationship between propositions and whole contexts, as in the section of the
Grundlagen quoted above (x2.3.2): \While looking at one and the same phe-
nomenon, I can say with equal truth both \It is a copse" and \It is ve trees",
or both \Here are four companies" and \Here are 500 men"."43 What Frege
is observing is that questions to which number phrases are the answer, as in
43 x46
74 2. A Setting for Frege
`how many are there?' should not be taken as having an absolute answer, in-
dependent of any context. If one points to a company and asks, `how many
are there?', two `equally correct' answers are possible (4 and 500). One ob-
ject cannot both be four things and at the same time 500 things, as these are
judgements ascribing dierent numbers to the same object. One would not say
object x is one thing, and immediately assert that the same x is two things,
without going on to ll out the variable phrases `thing' and `x':
[W]hat changes here from one judgment to the other is neither any
individual object, nor the whole, the agglomeration of them, but
only my terminology. But that itself is only a sign that one concept
has been substituted for another. (Grundlagen x46)
Providing an answer to the question `how many are there?' requires specication
of context; thus we nd that in the context of lling out `thing' with `company'
in the rst instance and with `men' in the second, the two assertions `here are
four companies' and `here are 500 men' lose all appearances of contradicting
each other. However, the object itself has not changed, only the way we are
regarding it.
It seems that Frege is telling us that the question `how many are there?'
cannot be given a full interpretation44 when supplemented only with an osten-
sive act of pointing|for instance, pointing at a pack of cards (the two answers
`1' [pack of cards] and `52' [individual cards] are both `correct'). Hence, the
context principle and the notion of multiple analysability are two sides of the
same coin. We are not to ask for the meaning of a word outside the context
of a proposition, whilst analysis of a proposition is prior to the question of
44 I.e. be regarded as `saturated'; we will come to Frege's notion of `saturation' in Chapter
Three, x3.2.2
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that proposition's truth (as evidenced by the possibility of altering the order
of antecedents and contraposing the terms of a complex Begrisschrift condi-
tional). The meaning of a word within the context of a proposition is xed by
analysis of that proposition|for instance, whether it is to be taken as (part of
the) function or (part of the) argument. In order for the meaning of a word
to be given, it must be placed in the context of a proposition; and once the
proposition is given one of its multiple analyses, the question of its truth can
be answered. Thus meaning is the amorphous aspect within the context of a
proposition prior to analysis, whilst truth is amorphous prior to an analysis
of a proposition within the larger context of a whole body of knowledge. The
idea behind truth being amorphous prior to analysis of a proposition within
the context of a body of knowledge is that the dierent possible analyses of
a proposition yield dierent objects (i.e. arguments for functions), and some
analyses may be incompatible with others due to their asserting the existence
of dierent collections of objects.
Multiple anaysability, as a general principle, is the result of Kant's dictum
that in order for analysis to proceed something must be synthesised together
prior to analysis being applied to a conception of language which goes beyond
the subject-predicate form. As Hans Sluga writes, \Frege's principle that words
only have meaning in the context of a sentence must be. . . interpreted as a lin-
guistic version of Kant's principle of the transcendental unity of judgment."45
We see that far from being an assertion of a priority of the analytic over the
synthetic, Frege's statement that arithmetic is analytic is actually a more sub-
tle claim. Kant claims that the synthetic holds priority over the analytic, as
analysis separates wholes into parts, whereas this separation is possible only if
the whole has already been synthesised out of parts:
45 `Frege's Alleged Realism', Inquiry, No. 20, 1977, p.238
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For where the understanding has not previously combined, it cannot
dissolve, since only as having been combined by the understanding
can anything that allows of analysis be given to the faculty of rep-
resentation. (Critique of Pure Reason, B130)
On my reading, Frege does not dispute this; rather, his claim that arithmetic
is analytic is a statement to the eect that given a context, any context, the
nature of the rational mind ensures that there is one and only one way in which
to reach correct arithmetical judgments about this context. Such judgments will
be performed relative to the thinkers orientation to the context|i.e. whether
one is looking for individual cards or whole packs. Thus the principle of multiple
analysability is the link between Kant and the context principle which motivated
Frege to (among other things) build interchangeability of subcomponents and
contraposition into his logical system in the way he did.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has been a review of the `philosophical' evidence for us to view
Frege's innovations as a change of setting. We bear in mind the two major
conditions, outlined in chapter one, which constitute the dierence between a
change of setting and a change simpliciter :
 that the questions addressed in the new settings show some continuity
with the old setting, and
 that the formulation of the new setting is a non-trivial intellectual achieve-
ment.
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The evidence for the satisfaction of the rst condition is Frege's addressing his
project in Kantian terms. This was argued for in x2, by identifying Frege's
motivations for desiring to characterise arithmetic as `analytic'; it was found
that his reason was to safeguard arithmetic against the possibility of alternatives
which had arisen for geometry|a possibility which is disallowed under Kant's
philosophy of mathematics. This was then followed by a detailed exposition of
some specic aspects of Frege's approach, especially the principle of multiple
analysability. The second condition is addressed by Frege's technical innovation,
the Begrisschrift, or concept-script; it allowed him (he hoped) to show, rather
than say, that arithmetic is possessed of dening attributes which ensure that
a non-equivalent system of arithmetic is not rationally possible|a conclusion
which was beyond the discursive musings of the Formalists and Empiricists.
However, this second conclusion is not, as yet, quite within our grasp. The
nal chapter will comprise a detailed study of a specic aspect of the system
that Frege constructed, using his Begrisschrift, in pursuit of his ultimate goal
of deriving the laws of arithmetic from logic alone.
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3. THE SYSTEM OF THE GRUNDGESETZE
3.1 Introduction
The system Frege expounded in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik1 is mammoth;
as of 2009, only around one-fth the two volumes have been published in En-
glish. This work was intended by Frege to substantiate the logicist claims made
in his Grundlagen nine years previously. In concluding the Grundlagen, Frege
had noted that \From the preceding it thus emerged as a very probable con-
clusion that the truths of arithmetic are analytic and a priori. . .We saw further
what is still needed to raise this probability to a certainty, and indicated the
path which must lead to that goal."2 The Grundgesetze is the attempt to ful-
l that promise|an absolutely thorough development of the natural number
system from nothing more than the laws of thought.3
The logical system presented in the Grundgesetze has many technical fea-
tures which are interesting from the point of view of the modern logician; for
example, functions are taken as `logically prior' to the sets which they deter-
1 Two volumes, 1893/1903. Translated to English by Montgomery Furth as The Basic
Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System (1964).
2 x109
3 Frege also intended to develop the real number system in a like manner; however, this
project was left only partially completed when Frege abandoned his logicist programme in
the wake of Russell's paradox.
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mine.4 This is opposed to the modern conception where functions are dened
as a special kind of set.5 Unfortunately, this system is also inconsistent|a con-
tradiction can be derived in it (Russell's paradox), using only logical resources.
The nature of this inconsistency has been the subject of a great deal of schol-
arship over the last hundred years or so.6 Therefore, I will not address the
paradox beyond a brief note of its eects on the future development of foun-
dational theories of mathematics; specically, Bertrand Russell's Type Theory
and the axiomatisation of Set Theory mainly due to Ernst Zermelo.
Russell's ramied theory of types was developed in his Principles of Mathe-
matics (1903), `Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types' (1908a),7
and Principia Mathematica (1910/12/13), co-authored with A.N. Whitehead.
Zermelo's axiomatisation of the set theory descended from Cantor and Dedekind
occurs mainly in `Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I' (1908a).8
The former approach assigns all functions a `type', or `level'; functions can
only take arguments which are of a lower type than they are.9 This blocks the
function `set which is not a member of itself' from taking itself as argument
(the origin of the inconsistency). While largely abandoned in modern times as
a research programme in the foundations of mathematics, it has found many
4 See `A Critical Elucidation of Some Points in E. Schroeder's Vorlesungen Ueber die Alge-
bra der Logik ': \I do, in fact, maintain that the concept is logically prior to its extension; and
I regard as futile the attempt to take the extension of a concept as a class, and make it rest,
not on the concept, but on single things." (p.106 in Geach & Black [eds]) For a comparison
between Frege's approach and that of Russell & Whitehead, see Furth's introduction to the
Grundgesetze, p.xli=ii
5 Specically, a set of ordered pairs; for a similar discussion in a modern context, see
Chapter One, x1.3.3.
6 See for instance Boolos (1987) & (1986/87) and Parsons (1987) (all reprinted in De-
mopoulos (1995)). Aside from these, there are numerous articles addressing various aspects
of Russell's paradox and its impact on Frege. Any introductory text will contain at least a
chapter; for instance, Chapter 5 of Currie (1982), Chapter 5 of Macbeth (2005), and Section
2 of Zalta (2009). Link (2004) is an entire book dedicated to the paradox.
7 Reprinted in van Heijenoort (1967), pp.150{182
8 Reprinted in ibid., pp.199{215
9 The type-level is indicated by an index located in the upper right corner of the function-
name; e.g. f2(x1) is a type-level 2 function taking a type-level 1 argument.
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fruitful applications in computer science.
The latter approach is based upon a modication of Frege's Basic Law V
(that which sanctions the derivation of the contradiction). The modied axiom,
which is usually called `comprehension' or `abstraction', states that a set can
be dened by a function only if that set is a subset of a larger set which has
already been dened. One cannot create sets ex nihilo, or (equivalently) by
unrestricted abstraction. While this is seemingly a more ad hoc answer to the
problem, this kind of set theory remains the conventionally accepted `founda-
tion' of mathematics (see Chapter One for a contemporary discussion).
In the following I focus mainly on Frege's notion of `logical objects' and
the use he makes of them. My contention is that he uses them to connect the
mind to the world, in that their existence is implied by the presence of a ra-
tional mind (a position with numerous anities with Transcendental Idealism).
Looking into Frege's ontology for particular evidence for this claim, we will nd
that his distinction between functions and objects easily accommodates such
an approach. Furthermore, Frege appropriates the mathematical notion of a
function, and applies it to philosophical aspects of the foundations of math-
ematics. Down the line we will come to the construction of the denition of
one-to-one correspondence in the Grundgesetze; in following this construction
we will see that Frege makes considerable use of the logical objects which are
the `extensions' of functions. These objects, extensions, lie at the very bound-
ary of function and object; and this boundary, I will argue, is the most basic in
Frege's ontology. Thus we begin with an introduction to the concepts necessary
for this investigation.
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3.2 Functions and Objects
3.2.1 Functions
By the late 19th century, the function had become one of the main focuses in
philosophically-minded mathematical investigations in continental Europe. It
had been discovered that functions can be dened which are nowhere contin-
uous, such as `the function which takes the value zero for rational arguments
and the value one for irrational arguments' (known as the Dirichlet function).
There are also functions which are everywhere continuous but nowhere dieren-
tiable, such as the Koch function. The existence of this sort of function showed
that the intuitive connection between continuity and dierentiability was not
as close as it seemed;10 dierentiability implies continuity, but not vice versa.
Mathematicians were becoming less condent in their understanding of what
exactly a function is, despite the fact that what they could do with them was
becoming more and more advanced.
In his works, both philosophical and technical, Frege appropriates the notion
of a function for his own uses. For him, a function is the most basic unit,
the link between his conception of mathematics and natural language; virtually
everything which occurs in Frege's system can be described in terms of functions.
In the essay `Function and Concept',11 Frege states that
. . . the eld of mathematical operations that serve for constructing
functions has been extended. Besides addition, multiplication, ex-
ponentiation, and their converses, the various means of transition to
10 MacBeth (2000), pp.173-4
11 In Geach & Black, pp.21-41
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the limit have been introduced|to be sure, without people's being
always clearly aware that they were thus adopting something essen-
tially new. People have gone further still, and have actually been
obliged to resort to ordinary language, because the symbolic lan-
guage of Analysis failed; e.g. when they were speaking of a function
whose value is 1 for rational and 0 for irrational arguments.
Secondly, the eld of possible arguments and values for functions has
been extended by the admission of complex numbers. In conjunction
with this, the sense of the expressions `sum,' `product,' etc., had to
be dened more widely.
In both directions I go still further. (p.28)
By `in both directions, I go still farther', Frege means that he has made the
function the basic unit in his theory. The distinction between particular and
general referring expressions is made out in terms of the properties of functions;
this itself has a bearing on the distinction between an object and its name, as we
shall see. Even the Begrisschrift connectives in the Grundgesetze, such as B
A
are conceived as functions. In modern logic, logical terms such as connectives
and quantiers are taken to be syncategorematic items, which means they are
incapable of being meaningful by themselves. For example, `!', or `:', are
not meaningful terms (while both `A ! B' and `:A' are). An example of the
modern approach to sentential connectives:
The ve symbols
:;^;_;!;$
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are called sentential connective symbols. Their use is suggested by
the English translation given above [example: ^ = connective sym-
bol = English: and]. In translating to and from English, their role
never changes. (Enderton, H.B. (2001) A Mathematical Introduction
to Logic, 2nd edition)
We can see that this modern treatment denes the connectives in a rather
intuitive manner, while the truth-value of a statement is dened in terms of a
further function called a truth assignment. Thus, the connective symbols say
nothing about truth in themselves. In contrast, Frege describes ` 

' as
a \function of two arguments"12 which is dened as


=

the True, if  is the False or  is the True, or
the False otherwise.
The universal quantier and negation are dened in similar terms. Thus we
can see that Frege is conceiving of the conditional as a function which takes
truth-values A and B as arguments, and gives the truth-value of `if A is the
case, then B is the case'.
3.2.2 Objects
Besides functions, there is one other type of thing in Frege's system, objects.
The distinction between functions and objects is the most basic in Frege's con-
ception of logic, as evidenced by his early mention of it in the Grundgesetze:
12 Grundgesetze, x12
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Objects stand opposed to functions. Accordingly I count as objects
everything that is not a function. . . (x2)
The function/object distinction is a metaphysical one; it demarcates all entities
into two categories. However, we also need a way of apprehending this distinc-
tion; a method of recognising, for any given thing, whether it is a function or an
object. Thus, Frege supplies an epistemic counterpart to the function/object
distinction, which is given by the notion of saturation.
Let us begin with an example of Frege's. In `Function and Concept' Frege
states that \I am concerned to show that the argument does not belong with
the function, but goes together with the function to make a complete whole; for
the function by itself must be called incomplete, in need of supplementation,
or `unsaturated.'"13 What Frege has in mind is the following situation: there
is a distinct dierence between, say, `2x3 + x' and `2:13 + 1'. The one which
Frege focusses on is that the latter is an instance of the former. `1' has been
substituted for `x'. This is what Frege calls the act of `saturating' the function.
The former example is `in need of completion' because it does not name any
particular number, i.e. does not refer to a determinate object, while the latter
does|it names the number 3.
Frege notes that his way of drawing this distinction would be better served
by dispensing with the notation for variables altogether. Thus, `2x3 + x' would
be `2( )3+( )' (the reason Frege does not actually use this method of symbolising
an unsaturated function is that it cannot deal with functions of two or more
variables. `2( )3 + ( )' could be either `2x3 + x' or `2x3 + y'; we cannot tell if
13 p.24
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we are to be uniform in lling in the argument places or not).14 Functions are
`incomplete names', which can be saturated with any complete name to yield
a complete name.15 In our example, we start with the unsaturated 2x3 + x;
because this expression is unsaturated, it names a function. We then saturate
it by putting the name `2' in the argument-places. This gives us the expression
2:23 + 2. This expression is a name for an object, the number 18; it names
an object because it is saturated. Indeed, `2:23 + 2' has the same reference as
`18'; they both name the number eighteen.16 Thus, the metaphysical distinction
between functions and objects is signied to us by the logical distinction between
a saturated expression and an unsaturated one.
3.2.3 Special Objects
There are two kinds of objects which play deep, structural roles in Frege's
system.17 These are
 the two truth-values, the True and the False, and
 `courses-of-values', which are dened by their respective functions.
14 It has been brought to my attention that Frege could have used subscripts to dierentiate
argument-places, as in `2( )31 + ( )2'. However, this notation itself can be thought of as a
shorthand for variables, or vice-versa. It could be more pedagogical for Frege's purposes;
nevertheless in what follows we will use as much standard notation as possible.
15 We shall see, in the exposition that follows, that indeed any object can ll an argument-
place; for Frege, there is no such thing as a restricted domain of discourse. The laws of logic
are the laws of thought, and they stand at the very centre of our ability to cognise. Thus,
they have full universal applicability; any function which is claimed to be dened using only
logical resources must have a well-dened value for any given input. We shall see that Frege
expends some eort dening the values of functions which are `naturally' intended to have
numerical arguments for non-numerical arguments. For example, the addition function + ,
is stipulated to be zero if either  or  is any object other than a number (such as Julius
Caesar). 140+ Julius Caesar= 0. Cf. Furth's introduction to the Grundgesetze, p.x.
16 However, they have dierent senses; we shall cover this in due course
17 Which is not to say that ordinary objects like tables and chairs do not play any role; just
that the roles they play are not as important to the structure of Frege's logic.
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Both are intimately related to extensions. We begin with an explication of the
role of the truth-values.
A saturated function (read `name for an object') refers to some object; this
is obvious for those expressions traditionally conceived as functions, such as
numerical functions. However, for Frege, all expressions are functions. Consider
what happens when we take an arithmetical function, and append a suspected
result with an `=' sign; for instance, 2:23 + 2 = 18. This expression refers not
to a number, for instead it refers to the True; it is a dierent expression from
`2:23 + 2':
. . . I call the number four the denotation of \4" and of \22", and I
call the True the denotation of \3 > 2". (Grundgesetze x2)
Similarly,
`22 = 4' stands for the True as, say, `22' stands for 4. And `22 = 1'
stands for the False. (`Function and Concept', p.28/29)
All expressions which describe a situation in which something is the case refer to
one or the other of the two truth-values. They are functions which take various
things as arguments, but give either the True or the False as value. If one asserts
something that is not the case, such as 2:23+2 = 19, then one is referring to the
False. These expressions are merely a particular type of saturated function, the
object referred to being a truth-value. Frege calls the unsaturated form of such
an expression a `concept': \[I] call directly a concept a function whose value is
always a truth-value."18 Two functions which `stand for the same thing' can
18 Grundgesetze x3
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ag both sides of an `=' sign to create a true statement.
The other type of object which plays a central role in the system of the
Grundgesetze is what Frege calls `the course-of-values of a function'.19 It will
suce for our current purposes to note that the course-of-values of a function is
the class of objects which can be used to saturate that function to give a name for
the True; in this it is similar to the modern set-theoretic method of dening n-
place functions as particular sets of ordered n+1-tuples.20 For example, we can
represent the course-of-values of the function 2 =  over N (a 1-place function)
by the class of ordered pairs fh0; 0i; h1; 1i; h2; 4i; h3; 9i; : : : h16; 256i : : :g, or in
other words, fhx; yi : x2 = yg. However, the set-theoretic notion of a set or
class is not entirely equivalent to Frege's courses-of-values. One dierence is
that in modern set theory, a function is dened by the requisite set of ordered
pairs. For Frege, a course-of-values is dened by the function. The order of
priority between functions and classes is reversed.
This may, on the face of it, seem counter-intuitive; for is it not the case that
a mathematician will be confronted with a set of data-points, and then take
this as determining the function? In `Function and Concept', Frege devotes a
few paragraphs to this question, and so shall we. Also, this discussion further
claries the relationship between functions and arguments. Frege says:
People. . . recognise the same function again in
`2:13 + 1,' `2:43 + 4,' `2:53 + 5,'
19 `Course-of-values' is, of course, a translated term; it has also been rendered as `value-
range'. I cleave to Furth's choice of `course-of-values' as it his translation of the Grundgesetze
which I make the most use of.
20 See Chapter One, x1.3.3; n is the number of arguments the function takes, the representa-
tive tuple for a given function will need to also include the value of the function for the given
inputs. Hence, 1-place functions will be represented by classes of ordered doublets, 2-place
functions by triplets, and so on.
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only with dierent arguments, viz. 1, 4, and 5. From this we may
discern that it is the common element of these expressions that
contains the essential peculiarity of a function; i.e. what is present
in
`2:x3 + x'
over and above the letter `x.' (p.24)
It seems that Frege is endorsing some kind of `abstractionist' view in this
passage, stating that we `abstract' the general form from a collection of par-
ticular statements. However, such views about physical properties had been
around since the time of Locke, and had been decisively refuted, not least by
Frege himself. General terms simply cannot have their genesis in aggregates of
particulars|the issue of underdetermination cannot be resolved. Nevertheless,
an appeal to the recurring theme of this discussion, the distinction between the
metaphysical and epistemic aspects of a judgement. We can hold it true that we
do epistemically abstract the function. However, we can avoid the diculties
which plague pure abstractionist accounts such as Locke's account of general
terms. We hold that the constitutive aspects of the judgement, the reasons
why we hold it to be true, involve holding the function to be prior to the class
it determines. But, all the counter-intuitive consequences of such a view are
to do with aspects of how we come to acknowledge the actuality of the judge-
ment. Thus, we accept the abstractionist account for describing the context of
discovery, but reject for the context of justication. This brings us to anther
aspect of Frege's system. To fully appreciate how functions are related to their
courses-of-values, we must avail ourselves of Frege's distinction between sense
and reference.
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3.2.4 Sense and Reference
The distinction between sense and reference is a distinction between the meta-
physical and epistemic aspects of a function (and thus, by extension, to all
expressions). We shall rst give the distinction for saturated functions, and
then move on to unsaturated functions, which refer to courses-of-values. The
reference of a saturated function (i.e., a name21) is the object that it claims to
refer to, provided that it has this reference. The sense of a name is the manner
in which we come to know what the reference is.22 Consider the equivalent
functions y = (3 + 1)2 and y = 32 + 2:3 + 1; they have the same referent, the
True for y = 16. However, the arithmetical operations which we must perform
in order to ascertain the referent are dierent. For the rst function, we add 3
and 1, and then multiply the result by itself. In the second case, we multiply 3
by itself, add 2 times 3 to the result, and then add 1 to this result. The practical
aspects of determining the referent of these two functions are dierent; that is
to say, the contingent facts-of-the-matter about how we come to recognise the
referent are dierent. However, this does not interfere with the metaphysical,
meaning-dependent fact that they do, in fact, have the same referent. Frege
states that \Accordingly `22 = 4,' `2 > 1,' `24 = 42,' stand for the same thing,
viz. the True, so that in (22 = 4) = (2 > 1) we have a correct equation."23 Now
it is obvious that while `22 = 4' and `2 > 1' are both true, it does not follow
that they actually make the same assertion. Frege accepts this, arguing that
they have the same reference|the True|but dierent senses. The sense of the
21 Cf. x2 of the Grundgesetze
22 Cf. Currie (1982) p.85: \Roughly speaking, the sense of an expression is the information
which it conveys. Every true sentence refers to the truth-value true. But two true sentences
can say dierent things, and have dierent contents. The content of a sentence is the Thought
[Gedanke] expressed by it|its sense."
23 `Function and Concept', p.29
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former is the `thought'24 that two multiplied by itself is four, while that of the
second that two is a greater quantity than one. \We see from this that from
identity of reference there does not follow identity of the thought [expressed]."25
As mentioned above, functions are logically prior to their courses-of-values.
What this means is that in order to be able to perform the epistemic act of
recognising a function's course-of-values, we must be able to apprehend what
the function says. In other words, in order to determine the function's referent,
we must be able to comprehend its sense.26 At this juncture it is quite important
to realise that the sense of an expression is not the idea that it invokes. This
is essential; for it serves to separate the subjective ideas or impressions which
may be evoked by an intellect's discernment of a sense from the essentially
objective content which actually makes up the sense.27 For example, the fact
that having to multiply 2 by itself may evoke, in a given individual, certain
memories of being taught how to multiply, this in no way impinges upon or
contributes to the dierence in sense between `y = (3+1)2' and `y = 32+2:3+1'.
Such memories belong rmly to the context of discovery, and should not be
associated with the context of justication. This is vitally important to Frege,
as it is the subjectivism which is a consequence of an Empiricist orientation to
mathematical truth which was one of his main polemic targets.
As courses-of-values are objects, they must be the value of some kind of
function. And, indeed, they are; Frege denes the function () to be the
course-of-values of the function (). For instance, take an example given
above, the squaring function. `(2)' names the class fhx; yi : x2 = yg. The
24 \`24 = 42' and `4:4 = 42' have the same reference, but do not the same sense (which
means, in this case: they do not contain the same thought)." (Function and Concept, p.29)
25 Ibid., insertion by translator
26 The exact nature of how we comprehend senses is one of the vague points in Frege's
philosophy of language; cf. `The Thought: A Logical Enquiry'.
27 Cf. `On Sense and Reference', in Geach & Black, p.60-61
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function () takes the function  as argument and gives 's course-of-values
as its value. Thus, () is a saturated function (when  is a determinate name
of a function)|that is to say, it is an object. Here we have an instance of the
sometimes subtle distinction Frege makes between an object and the name for
it: because Frege never gives an explicit denition of what a course-of-values is,
but only a contextual denition, there is in general no symbol for 's course-of-
values other than () itself. More will be said about this, and other aspects
of courses-of-values, in the coming sections.
3.2.5 Generality
The distinction between saturated and unsaturated functions perfectly mirrors
the distinction between particular and general expressions. A saturated function
is a name of a particular object; if it names more than one object, then what is
being named is not an object, but a predicate. For instance, let `'' be a property
that is possessed by one and only one object (being the 22nd President of the
United States of America, say). Then we can regard ourselves as able to talk
about `the '' (the 22nd President). On the other hand, unsaturated functions
refer to their courses-of-values; they are general in a manner which saturated
functions are not. An instance of this is the way in which Frege explains the
nature of the variable.
In the essay `What is a Function?', Frege's main polemic target is concep-
tions which regard variables as numbers that are capable of changing. He says
\. . . there are not variable numbers. . . these letters [x; y, etc] are not proper
names of variable numbers in the way that `2' and `3' are proper names of con-
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stant numbers. . . ".28 Consider the analogous example of the phrase `the king
of this realm' (Frege's example). Compare this with a phrase which describes
a supposedly `variable' number: `the number that gives the length of this rod
in millimeters'. The rod mentioned in the second sentence can be heated and
cooled; thus, the number which the phrase describes can vary. The rod could
be 110 millimeters long; we then subject it to heat; we re-measure and nd that
the rod now has a length of 110.5 millimeters.29 Now, if this were the case,
the phrase `the king of this realm' could be taken as naming a variable man.
Consider the statement \Ten years ago the king of this realm was an old man;
at present the King of this realm is a young man". It is directly analogous to
the rod-length example: \. . . by using this expression I have designated a man
who was an old man and is now a young man."30 This is implied by the king
example, whilst `I have designated a number which was 110 and is now 110.5'
is implied by the rod example.
Frege notes that the idea that one can designate a man who is getting
progressively younger is a sign that \[t]here must be something wrong here."31
It is obvious that the phrase designating the king is in fact designating two
dierent men, one old, one young; what determines the referent is the time at
which the phrase `the king of this realm' is uttered. Uttered ten years ago, it
names the old man|uttered now, it names the young man. Likewise with the
rod example. What we need to do is to incorporate a reference to a time-frame
in order to determine exactly which number is being referred to. `The length
of this rod in millimeters at tn' is capable of naming a dierent number to `the
length of this rod in millimeters at tn+1'. It is the absence of a reference to a
28 p.109
29 `What is a Function?', p.108: \. . . when I say \the number that gives the length of this rod
in millimeters" I am naming a number; and this is variable, because the rod does not always
keep the same length; so by using this expression I have designated a variable number."
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
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time-frame which gives the illusion that the number being named is variable,
that is to say, is a number which can alter its value.
Further arguments against the notion of `variable' numbers are given in
`What is a Function?'. One such argument invokes the way we are able to
dierentiate numbers on recognition. The names of dierent natural numbers
designate objects, the dierences between which we are able to describe. We
know that what makes `2' and `3' dierent numbers is that when added, sub-
tracted, multiplied by or divided into some third number they will give dierent
sums, dierences, products and quotients. Also, we can determine what these
dierent results will be. The situation is somewhat dierent when it comes
to variables. Frege asks \. . . what is the dierence between the variables that
are said to be designated by `x' and `y'?" The answer is that \We cannot
say."32 We are unable to specically name any dierences between x and y.33
Furthermore, it is not a priori impossible that x = y (they could be the same
number). What Frege is getting at here is that the symbols `x' and `y' do not
actually designate anything beyond the `empty spaces' (i.e. argument places)
in unsaturated functions:
[H]ere we come upon what distinguishes functions from numbers.
`Sin' requires completion with a numeral,34 which, however, does
not form part of the designation of the function. This holds good
in general; the sign for a function is `unsaturated'; it needs to be
completed with a numeral, which we then call the argument-sign.
32 Ibid., p.109
33 Except the trivial distinction between the symbols `x' and `y'; however, this distinction is
irrelevant, as we are talking about what the symbols designate, not the symbols themselves.
Frege was denitely aware of the necessity of such a distinction: cf. Currie (1982), p.55:
\. . . the attention to semantic and syntactic distinctions [in the Grundgesetze] was something
that logicians had not previously attained."
34 [As in `sin 2', sin 3', etc.]
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(`What is a function?', p.113/4)
It is because functions such as y = mx+c are unsaturated that they have general
content, and which gives their open argument-places the appearance of being
`variable'. It is not that an unsaturated numerical function contains numbers
designated by the signs `x', `y', and so forth, which can vary and which gives
a dierent value depending on what the variable numbers are at the moment
of computation; rather, the function denotes a collection, rather than a single
object:
People have got used to reading the equation `y = f(x)' as `y is
a function of x.' There are two mistakes here: rst, rendering the
equals-sign as a copula; secondly, confusing the function with its
value for an argument. From these mistakes has arisen the opinion
that the function is a number, although a variable or indenite one.
(Ibid., p.115; all emphasis except on the rst `equals' mine.)
Here we see Frege re-stating his opinion that functions are essentially dierent
from numbers. Numbers are objects, by virtue of their being designated by
saturated functions. Unsaturated functions do not designate any individual
numbers; this is why Frege says that `the opinion that a function is a variable
number' is a `mistake'.
An unsaturated function is general in that it can, upon completion, designate
a particular entity. However, until this happens, it does not designate any
particular object; the closest thing which comes to being referred to is its course-
of-values.35 What it denitely does not designate is a particular entity which
35 The exact nature of this relationship will have to wait until we analyse Frege's function
96 3. The System of the Grundgesetze
is somehow capable of change.
3.2.6 Conclusion
The metaphysical distinction between functions and objects gives Frege a way of
explaining generality (in particular, the apparent variable nature of functions)
which does not require entities which are capable of changing. However, Frege
needs a way to explain how two seemingly dierent functions can have the
same course-of-values without immediately becoming themselves identical. The
sense/reference distinction serves this purpose by stating that two functions,
such as y = (x + 1)2 and y = x2 + 2x + 1 are actually presentations of the
same logical relationship|they both designate the same metaphysical entity,
their identical courses-of-values|which have a dierent sense. That is to say,
they are epistemically dierent presentations of the same metaphysical entity.
However, this epistemic dierence does not imply any metaphysical dierence;
Frege is not assenting to the view that a table viewed from dierent angles,
resulting in dierent shaped sense-impressions, amounts to there being dierent
tables.36 Thus a common theme of our discussion of Frege remains constant:
the context of discovery and the context of justication must be kept separate.
3.3 Extensions as Objects in the system of the Grundgesetze
In this part we are going to examine aspects of the formal system Frege presents
in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Logic, for Frege, comprises the laws of
for the denite article.
36 As occurs in the subjective idealism of George Berkeley; see his Treatise Concerning the
Principles of Human Knowledge.
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thought; and as such, encompasses arithmetic. However, Frege's derivation of
arithmetic from logic involves ineliminable use of objects, necessitated by his
distinction between saturated and unsaturated functions. Thus, we will take
particular interest in Frege's methods of formalising this relationship, and his
ways of passing from concepts to objects and vice versa. We begin with his
function for the denite article, and trace his use of courses-of-values in the
stipulation of the conditions a function must full in order to be a one-to-one
correspondence.
However, before beginning, we shall quickly review Frege's conventions re-
garding the use of Gothic letters, Roman (Latin) letters, and Greek letters.
 Upper-case Greek letters:  ;; etc. These are used as `placeholder'
names, e.g. ` (a)', or ` '. Specically, they are metalinguistic variables,
and are absent from all asserted propositions of the formal language.37
 Lower-case Greek letters: ; ; ' etc. These are used as placeholder-names
for arguments (although this is a dierent case than that for bound vari-
ables), much like free variables in mathematical formulae, e.g. `F ()'.
Like capital Greek letters, these do not occur in any formal proofs.38
 Lower-case Greek vowels: ;  etc. Used in the notation for courses-of-
values, as in () = 	(). This will be discussed in due course.
 Lower-case Roman letters (from the beginning of the alphabet): a; b; c etc.
Used as object-names, as in (a).
 Upper-case Roman letters (from the middle of the alphabet): F;G;H etc.
Used as function-names, as in F (').
37 See p.xxviii of Furth's introduction to the Grundgesetze, and footnote 15 of the main
text.
38 see ibid., x1.
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 Lower-case Gothic letters (from the middle of the alphabet): f; g; h etc.
Used in conjunction with the `concavity' f to serve as a bound functional
variable, e.g. f f(a)|in modern notation, 8FFa.
 Lower-case Gothic letters (from the beginning of the alphabet): a; b; c etc.
Analogous to the case with Upper-case Gothic letters, these signs serve
as bound object-variables, as in a (a)|in modern notation, 8x(x).
3.3.1 Courses-of-Values
Up until now, we have been talking `around' courses-of-values, by viewing them
informally as sets, without really addressing how Frege denes them. However,
we are about to begin an in-depth formal examination of Frege's system; thus
we need to avail ourselves of the notion that Frege actually uses, as opposed to
an anachronistic stand-in. In the Grundgesetze, Frege rst introduces the notion
of a course of values early in the text, in x3. He initially gives the following
intuitive denition:
I use the words
\the function () has the same course-of-values as the
function 	()"
generally to denote the same as the words
\the functions () and 	() have always the same value
for the same argument".
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Frege is giving a contextual denition to explicate his notion of a course-of-
values.39 That is to say, rather than explicitly dening what a course-of-values
is, he merely gives the condition under which two courses-of-values can be recog-
nised as the same. For instance, consider the two functions `y = (x + 3)2' and
`y = x2 + 6x + 9'. It is easily veried that these two functions have the same
y-value for any given x-value; thus, in Frege's terminology, they have the same
`course-of-values'.
When it comes to functions whose values are always either the True or the
False, we can treat the phrases `course-of-values of the function' and `extension
of the concept' as interchangeable. Likewise, these sorts of functions can be
referred to as `concepts'. So, for the two concepts `x is a round square' and
`x is a piece of wooden iron', we can say both that the two have numerically
identical40 courses-of-values and that they share the same extension (as they
assume the value of the False for any x).
x9 is where Frege introduces his notation for courses-of-values. He employs
a symbolism where a small Greek vowel with an acute accent is followed by an
expression in parentheses; this expression is that whose course-of-values is being
denoted by the whole. Accordingly, the variables which are being evaluated are
replaced by the same small Greek vowel (without the accent). For example,
the course-of-values of the function `x2 + (x  2)' is denoted by (2 + (  2)).
Likewise, the concept [( + 3)(   3)] = (2   9)41 denotes the True, as
8x([(x+ 3)(x  3)] = (x2   9)). Similarly, according to Frege:
39 Cf. the formalisation of this denition as Basic Law V, given below.
40 As opposed to qualitatively identical. Two objects are numerically identical if they are
in fact the same object; two objects are qualitatively identical if they are of the same kind,
belong to the same sortal, etc.
41 Frege uses dierent Greek vowels on each side of the `=' as a notational device to re-
mind us that we are equating the courses-of-values of two dierent functions, rather than
amalgamating them into one. This is similar to the dierence between `' and `='.
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(2   ) = (  (  1))
is the value of the function
 = (  (  1))
for the argument (2   ).(x9)
Thus we reach the general symbolised denition of equality of course-of-values:
(8xFx = Gx)  (F () = G())
which is stated as Frege's Basic Law V:
(f() = g()) = ( a f(a) = g(a)):
We are now in a position to follow Frege's denition of one-one correspondence.
3.3.2 The Function-Name for the Denite Article: n
We begin with x11, where Frege explains the function-symbol `n' for  as
argument. This function designates the denite article. A denite article is
an expression of the form `the such-and-such'. In such cases, the intended
course-of-values for such a function contains one and only one object.42 We
want to be able to equate a function which is realised by only one object with
that object itself, in order to, among other things, be able to use numbers
(which are extensions of concepts) as arguments for rst-level functions. We
can paraphrase Frege's denition thus:43
n =

, if there exists an object  such that the argument  = ( = ); or
, if no such object exists.
42 Similar in spirit to Russell's denite descriptions. An indenite article is a phrase of the
form `a such-and-such'.
43 Cf. Ibid., x11
3.3. Extensions as Objects in the system of the Grundgesetze 101
This function serves to equate concepts under which fall only one object with
that object itself. If the concept has more than one object in its course-of-values,
then the value of the function is the concept itself. The reason for this second
clause is Frege's methodological stipulation that a function be well-dened for
any argument; that is to say, that a function always have a determinate value
for a determinate argument. Nevertheless, it is the rst clause which does the
work in the development of Frege's analytic denition of `number'. As noted
by Currie, \The second stipulation is simply a convenient way of making sure
that the function is dened for all possible arguments. It is for the rst class
of cases that the function serves its intended purpose."44
Frege himself species the function thus:
[T]wo cases [of the occurrence of n] are to be distinguished:
1. If to the argument there corresponds an object  such that the
argument is ( = ), then let the value of the function n be 
itself;
2. if to the argument there does not correspond an object  such
that the argument is ( = ), then let the value of the function be
the argument itself. (Grundgesetze x11)
He then supplies some examples. We are told that `2 = n(+3 = 5)' names the
True. This is because the value of `n( + 3 = 5)' is, in fact, the unique object
`2' which falls under the concept which is the argument for n. That is to say,
`(+3 = 5)' names the course-of-values of the function `+3 = 5', which is the
collection of objects which can each assume the position of `' while keeping it
44 (1982), p.127
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the case that the whole,  + 3 = 5, names the True.45 Now, there is only one
object which can take the place of . It is the number 2. Thus, (+3 = 5) only
names one object: 2. Hence, by the denition of n, the rst of the two cases is
taking place. There is an object , 2, such that the argument|(+3 = 5)|is
of the form ( = ).46 Thus, when  = ( + 3 = 5), the value of n is the
unique object which comprises the course-of-values named as the argument; i.e.,
n(+ 3 = 5) = 2.
So much for the rst case; we shall now look at an example of the second.
Frege gives the example of the concept `being a square root of one'. We know
that more than one object falls under this concept, as both 12 = 1 and ( 1)2 =
1. Our situation is this: because both `1 is a square root of one' and `negative
one is a square root of one' are phrases which name the True, we know we are in
a number two-type case with respect to the function n. Thus, no unique object
is named; rather, the sign for this concept's course-of-values| `(2 = 1)', when
taken as argument for the function n, gives us the value of the entire course-of-
values|which is named by the symbol for the argument. Hence, n(2 = 1) =
(2 = 1). So, the two cases run like this: if the course-of-values of a concept is
comprised of only one object, then the value of the `denite article' function for
that course-of-values is that object; in all other cases (including empty courses-
of-values and ill-dened arguments) the result is the argument|`n' works like
the identity function. `n schmoggle = schmoggle' is the True, given that there
are no schmoggles.
45 This is not, strictly speaking, the case; there is some uncertainty regarding exactly what
kind of collection Frege understood a course-of-values to be (if indeed he had any such un-
derstanding). Furth, in his introduction to the Grundgesetze, takes extensions of concepts
to be collections of ordered n-tuples where the rst n  1 elements are objects which ll the
argument-places of the concept and the nth element is a truth-value (p.xxxviii). I believe
that my elucidation gives a maximally intuitive grasp with a minimum loss of detail, and thus
will progress with it as given.
46 If you need further convincing, consider it this way: we can replace the  in (+ 3 = 5)
by , and then `balance' the equation, yielding ( = 5  3)
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3.4 Names, Objects, and the Denite Article
It is becoming apparent that there are multiple connections between Frege's
approaches to functions and objects, generality, and the denite article. These
themes will now be drawn closer together, making plain the eects of Frege's
transcendental idealism on the foundations of his formal system. At the very
root of this is his conception of the relationship between an object and its
singleton set (or unit class), which is a particular case of that between functions
and objects. This conception, it turns out, is opposed to that of modern set
theory.
Frege's `function-name' for the denite article47 is constructed by specifying
two cases. The second case amounts to an identity function. Hence, even if the
argument is not of the intended sort, the function will provide a well-dened
output (or, at least, the output will always be at least as well-dened as the
input). The function itself cannot lead us astray.48 The Grundgesetze contains
an axiom49 governing the behaviour of this function (Basic Law VI):
a = n(a = )
Basically, this axiom states that the name of an object and the name of the
class which contains that and only that object can be interchanged when the
object-name is prexed by `the'.50 In x11 of the Grundgesetze, where Frege rst
47 Frege makes a distinction between `functions' and `function-names'. A function is an
entity with a determinate ontological status; a function-name is the sign by which we denote
a function (cf. Grundgesetze x26). As will become apparent, the syntactic category is prior
to the ontological.
48 Cf. the discussion of logic as the `laws of thought' in x2.2.2
49 Frege actually states in x18 that the axiom `follows from' the denotation of n; hence,
it probably should not be regarded as an axiom in the modern sense. Nevertheless, I shall
follow Frege's convention of referring to it as such.
50 Compare Currie's reading: \It says that the value of the function for an argument which
is the extension of a concept under which exactly one thing falls is that thing itself." (1982),
p.128
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introduces this function (Basic Law VI does not appear until x18), he states
that \n( = ) =  is the True"; hence it appears that Frege intended the
interchangeability of object-name and class-name to run both ways. Now, if
we regard Frege's courses-of-values in a modern set-theoretic manner,51 as in
() = fx : x is a g, then basic law VI essentially states that
nx = fxg:
The denite article, for Frege, is the syntactic criterion for (claiming to be)
referring to an individual or unique object;52 moreover, courses-of-values are
collections of objects, and are closely (though not absolutely) approximated by
the modern notion of a set. The denition of the empty set is the same (the
collection of all objects not identical to themselves; (  = ) [Grundgesetze]
and fx : x 6= xg [ZF]); extensionality53 (two courses of values with all the
same members are the same course-of-values [though the same need not hold
for functions]; likewise for sets); and so forth.
One point of dierence is that modern Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory makes an
important distinction between an object and its singleton;54 in contrast, Frege's
system contains a function which can (if applied) equivocate them. However,
this occurs only if the relevant courses-of-values contains a single object (i.e.
nonempty sets with only one member). Thus, an important distinction for Frege
51 Fudging our notations in the process, for pedagogical purposes only. The notation for set
theory is that of Enderton's (2001).
52 Frege says as much in x38 of the Grundlagen: \When we speak of \the number one",
we indicate by means of the denite article a denite and unique object of scientic study."
See also `Function and Concept', p.23: \We say `the number,' not `a number'; by using the
denite article, we indicate that there is only a single number."
53 Cf. x0 of the Grundgesetze, where he states that Dedekind's assertion that a set S is
`completely determined' if for any given object it is determined whether it is a member of S
or not (implying that S = T if every member of S is a member of T ) \. . . comes near the
mark. . . ".
54 One reason for this distinction is the desire to not have any sets be self-membered; this is
related to the representation of natural numbers by sets and the possibility of non-standard
models of these representations.
3.4. Names, Objects, and the Denite Article 105
is between `singletons' and courses-of-values which contain multiple members.
For instance:
n( = ) = 
is the True, whereas
n( =  or   = ) 6=  or  :
What we actually get when applying Frege's function for the denite article to
collections not of one object is
n( =  or   = ) = ( =  or   = ):
If we fudge our notations a little by combining Frege's function for the denite
article with some modern set-theoretic notation, and put aside concerns about
the result of applying it to non-well-formed arguments, the situation becomes
clearer still. Let  be some unique object and  some non-unique object. Then,
the rst of the two cases above is
nfx : x = g = 
whereas the second is
nfx : x = g = fx : x = g:
The denite article function only equates a set with its member if that set only
has one member. It equates what may be termed `plural' sets with the set as
a whole.55 Collections of more than one member are general ; hence, a function
which names a plurality of objects must be unsaturated in some kind of way. On
the other hand, a function which names a single object behaves just like a name
for that object (and thus is saturated). The appearance of such generality-
related considerations explains Frege's use of the denite article; and these
55 Including the empty set.
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considerations are an outcome of Frege's Transcendental Idealism. It turns out
that these considerations bear on a debate in the current Frege literature|that
of `the concept horse'.
In Chapter Two I argued that Frege's approach to the ontology of arithmetic
was in fact motivated by an approach reminiscent of Kant's Transcendental
(read: objective) Idealism, rather than a straight-forward realist conception.
This interpretation rests upon a claim that when Frege asserted that arithmetic
is analytic, he was more concerned with establishing that there cannot be any
alternative systems of arithmetic (as there are for geometry). He sought to
ground arithmetic in logic, and thus in the very nature of rationality, much as
Kant had sought such grounds in intuition. This leads naturally a claim made
by Schirn in his (1990):
It is generally agreed that the distinction between concept and ob-
ject lies at the very heart of Frege's philosophy of logic. One of
its key elements is the primacy of the syntactic categories concept-
word (more generally: function-name) and proper name (singular
term) over the ontological ones concept (function) and object. (p.46;
emphasis original)
That Frege takes syntactic categories as prior to ontological ones is striking
evidence for an interpretation which favours transcendental idealism. Coming
from this is the idea that names and objects share a special kind of relationship;
names are primary, with the object being somehow `derived' from the name.
But what kind of `derivation' could this be?
A function-name which is saturated is a linguistic description of a determi-
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nate object. Hence, it is epistemically prior to that which it purports to name;
we must know what the name refers to before we can recognise an object as
that particular object. Likewise with functions (general names). The result-
ing dierence between function-names and proper names is that the former are
general, whilst the latter are not. This dierence results from their relative
saturation. Now, would a function which names a unit class56 be saturated or
not? Consider the phrase `positive number which, when multiplied by itself,
yields 4' Intuitively, we are speaking of the number 2. However, there is no
denite article in the phrase; we may be naming a collection of numbers. For
Frege, there is no logical dierence between (i) `positive number which when
multiplied by itself yields the number 4' and (ii) `positive number which, when
multiplied by itself, yields a number less than 10'; this phrase denitely names
a collection (1,2, and 3). Inserting a denite article into (i) gives `the positive
number which, when multiplied by itself, yields 4'; the presence of the denite
article makes it clear that we are naming a single object. It is just this behaviour
of the denite article which is captured by Frege's function:
fx : x > 0 and x2 = 4g = f2g
and hence
nfx : x > 0 and x2 = 4g = 2;
whereas
fx : x > 0 and x2 < 10g = f1; 2; 3g
thus
nfx : x > 0 and x2 < 10g = f1; 2; 3g:
Thus we have both fx : x > 0 and x2 = 4g = f2g and nfx : x > 0 and x2 =
4g = 2. Since equality is transitive, we can substitute `f2g' for `fx : x >
56 I.e. a course-of-values which contains a single object.
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0 and x2 = 4g', obtaining nf2g = 2; likewise for the second case, where we get
nf1; 2; 3g = f1; 2; 3g.
This shows why the denite article function will, when applied to a single-
ton, give the object which is the one and only member. A singleton is a proper
name|`the collection of objects which have these properties', when it so hap-
pens that the conjunction of such properties serves to describe one and only one
object.57 In that case, we may pass (via an application of the function-name for
the denite article) from the name to the object itself. A description of a collec-
tion of only one object can serve as a name for that object. On the other hand,
a function which names a plurality of objects|any number more than one|is
general, and refers to what may be properly called a `collection'. One cannot
pass from the collection (an epistemic entity) to an object, because it is not
determinate which object to `pass to' over and above the whole collection itself.
Thus, in general, nfxg = x, whereas nfx; yg = fx; yg. Bearing this in mind, I
will now argue that this perspective on the denite article function, motivated
by a trascendental idealist interpretation of Frege, gives a new perspective on
the so-called `paradox of the concept horse'.
3.4.1 The Paradox of `the Concept Horse'
This debate concerns the question of what exactly the reference of the expression
`the concept horse' is. This question has received considerable attention in the
last few decades of Frege scholarship. One particular vein of this debate has
taken place between Matthais Schirn and Marco Runo.
57 A paradigm example of such a property for macroscopic objects would be a millime-
ter/millisecond specic description of spatiotemporal location.
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Intuitively, the answer seems to be that it refers to the concept `horse'|
the position which would make it true that `the concept horse is a concept'.
However, in his `On Concept and Object' Frege claims that `the concept horse'
must refer to an object. If it did not, then the expression could not be used as a
grammatical subject, as it is in (apparently true) statements such as `the concept
horse is realised'. The reason that only objects can be grammatical subjects is
that only objects are saturated, and only saturated entities can play the role
of grammatical subjects. If an unsaturated entity is placed in the position of
grammatical subject, then the statement as a whole remains unsaturated, and
cannot name a truth-value. Thus, in order for `the concept horse is realised'
to have a truth-value at all `the concept horse' must name an object. The
discussion between Schirn and Runo concerns whether Frege's position, as
stated in `On Concept and Object', has implications which contradict broader
aspects of Frege's philosophy (with Schirn arguing `no', Runo arguing `yes').
We begin with Schirn. In his paper `Frege's Objects of Quite a Special
Kind'58, he argues that Frege's supposed identication of `the concept horse' and
`the extension of the concept horse' leads to intolerable conclusions. The main
argument for this `identication thesis' is that if `the concept horse' is in fact
an object, then this object is concept's extension; hence we can substitute the
expression `the extension of the concept horse' for `the concept horse' without a
change of reference. This is then implies that the truth-value of any statement
containing the latter expression will be the same as that of any expression
which is the result of said substitution. This leads to a kind of regress, where
the substitution can be iterated any given number of times, with the expression
`the extension of the extension of . . . the extension of the concept horse' having
the same reference as `the concept horse':
58 Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 1990), pp.27-60
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If \the concept F" and \the extension of the concept F" really did
have the same reference, then in the expression \the extension of
the concept F" the part \the concept F" could be replaced by \the
extension of the concept F" without altering the reference. And
in the resulting expression, \the extension of the extension of the
concept F", the part \the concept F" could again be replaced by
\the extension of the concept F", and so on ad innitum. Obviously,
no one would seriously assume that in Frege's view \the extension
of the extension of the extension of the concept F" designates the
same object as does \the concept F". (p.28)
I shall refer to this argument from now on as the `regress argument'. Runo,
in his `Extensions as Representative Objects in Frege's Logic'59 attempts to
counter Schirn's conclusion that this particular consequence of the identica-
tion thesis|the regress argument|is unacceptable. He rst addresses a slightly
dierent argument given by Schirn, to the conclusion that `the extension of A' is
`semantically vacuous'. Runo then gives a response, and states that \This rea-
soning provides an indication of how one could deal with the diculty pointed
out in Schirn's argument 1.2 as well."60 In order to fully explicate Runo's
response to the regress argument, I will rst have to explain his response to the
semantic vacuousness argument in order to reconstruct the `indication' that he
speaks of.
Schirn's explanation of the semantic vacuousness argument can be para-
phrased as follows:61
59 Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 52, No. 2(2000), pp.239-252
60 Ibid., p.148. Runo distinguishes between the `semantic vacuousness' argument and the
regress argument (stated above) in Schirn's paper; the former is termed argument 1.1, the
latter 1.2.
61 Schirn (1990), pp.29-30
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1. The two sentences (1) `there is at least one square root of 4' and (2) `the
extension of the concept square root of 4 is nonempty' are synonymous.
2. The two sentences (3) `the concept square root of 4 is realised' and (4)
`the concept square root of 4 is not empty' are also synonymous.
3. Since Frege says that (1) and (3) are synonymous, and synonymy is a
transitive relation, so are (2) and (4).
4. Synonymy is a relation between both reference and sense; hence (2) and
(4) express the same sense.
5. The sense of an expression is a function of the senses of its constituent
terms.
6. Therefore, the function-name `the extension of A' is `semantically vacuous'
(i.e. makes no dierence to either sense or reference), since (2) and (4)
are synonymous.
Schirn goes on to state that \The result is completely untenable, since for Frege
the function-name \the extension of [A]", which forms apart of the term \the
extension of the concept square root of 4", clearly has a sense and contributes
to determining the sense of the more complex term."62 Thus `the concept
A' and `the extension of the concept A' can only be synonymous if the term
`the extension of X' is semantically vacuous. I will outline Runo's response
to Schirn's argument, before attempting to follow his `indications' as to his
response to the identication argument. From there I will be able to move onto
my own response.
Runo's response to Schirn's semantic vacuousness argument is to allege
62 Ibid., p.30
112 3. The System of the Grundgesetze
that \No evidence is provided for this claim"63 (that quoted in the previous
paragraph). He claims that in this case, Schirn is begging the question by
presupposing the interpretation which he is seeking to endorse. Runo goes
on to state that we can accept that `the concept A' and `the extension of the
concept A' express the same sense without necessarily endorsing the idea that
`the extension of x' has no bearing on meaning:
. . . if `the concept F ' is a singular term in `the extension of the con-
cept F ', then `the extension of [A]' must be the name of a rst order
function.. . . Thus `the extension of [A]' is a name of the identity-
function, i.e., if we abbreviate by E(x) the expression `the extension
of [A]', then `E(a) = a' for every singular term `a'. Obviously a con-
sequence of this is that `E(E(E : : : E(a)) : : :) = E(a)' and `E(a) = a'
are true statements. This does not imply, however, that `E(x)' is
semantically vacuous; it is not so because it is a name for a function
(identity), and hence has both a reference and a sense. (p.247/8)
The moral that Runo draws from this is that the terms `the concept A' and
`the extension of the concept A' are together one of the cases where two terms
have the same reference without necessarily expressing the same sense.64 Now,
one of Frege's main motivations in introducing the sense/reference distinction
was to deal with non-trivial instances of identity;65 hence the identity func-
tion is a paradigm example of how two terms a and b can both name the
same object without a = b being an a priori truth in the way that a = a is.
Presumably, this is the route from Runo's `indication' as to his response to
63 Runo (2000), p.247
64 Although Runo is slightly guarded about this conclusion, stating \[the extension of A]
admittedly does not seem, at rst sight, to add to the sense of the latter [the concept square
root of 4 ]." (Ibid.)
65 See `On Sense and Reference' in Geach & Black (eds), pp.56-78
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the identication argument. It is not a priori that (in Runo's symbolism)
E(E(E : : : E(a)) : : :) = E(a), because in order for this to be the case `a' must
be a singular term; and this could very well not be an a priori truth. There is
only one sphinx; there could have been many. I now turn to my own take on
the situation.
The application of the function for the denite article sanctions the base
case of the regress argument. That is to say, nE(a) = a for a singular term a.
Likewise for the step case: nE(E(a)) = E(a), again for a singular a66 However,
the fact that a must be a singular term casts doubt on whether the function
for the denite article sanctions the regress argument for class terms such as
`man'.
In the Grundgesetze, Frege states that
We have here [in the function for the denite article] a substitute
for the denite article of ordinary language, which serves to form
proper names out of concept-words. For example, we form from the
words
\positive square root of 2",
which denote a concept, the proper name
\the positive square root of 2".
(x11, emphasis mine)
In `On Concept and Object', Frege makes a related assertion:
66 see the previous section; I am assuming that Runo's E(a) is equivalent to my set-
theoretic rendering of Frege, where `the extension of '= fx : x is a g.
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We designate [an] object by prexing the words `the concept'; eg.:
`The concept man is not empty.'
Here the rst three words are to be regarded as a proper name.
(p.46/7)
In a footnote to the quote above, Frege notes that he \. . . call[s] anything a
proper name if it is a sign for an object."67 From these statements follows
the conclusion that prexing the denite article to a concept-word yields the
name of an object. What object would this be? It seems that it should be the
extension of the concept. If we take `the concept `horse", and apply Frege's
function for the denite article, we get
nthe concept `horse' =
8<:
the single object named by `the concept `horse", if
there is one, or
the concept `horse' if there is not.
We already know that `the concept `horse" purports to name an object due to
the presence of the denite article; we should be in the rst clause. However,
there is no textual evidence stating what this object should be. The obvious
candidate object is the extension of the concept `horse', similar to the case
where the a in nE(a) = a is a singular term. But in this case a is not a singular
term, and thus the eect of the denite article is less straightforward. The best
argument for `the concept `horse" naming its own extension is that extensions
are objects, and singular objects at that (just as the set f1; 3; 5g is a single
set). Nevertheless, to invoke this in favour of equating denite articles of non-
singular concepts with their extensions is to beg the question. Furthermore,
Frege is often quite explicit in his denial of any kind of equating concepts and
objects,68 so perhaps (we can only speculate) he saw that in this case staying
vague was his best course.
67 `On Concept and Object', rst f/n on p.47
68 Cf. `On Concept and Object' p.x, Grundgesetze x2
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On the other hand, `the extension of the concept `horse" does name a single
object|the extension of the concept `horse'|which we can symbolise Runo-
style as E(h), faux-Frege-style as H(), and set-style as fx : x is a horseg. This
phrase names an extension, which is a single object, and hence we obtain the
identity nE(h) = E(h). For non-singular terms, `the extension of the concept
a' = `the extension of the concept a', but `the extension of the concept a 6= `the
concept a'.
The situation diers with E(E(a)) (ffx : x is an agg) cases, however. Con-
sider `the extension of the extension of the concept `horse". If this names a single
object, then we are in a rst-clause situation. Clearly, it refers to the exten-
sion of `the extension of the concept `horse", and `the extension of the concept
`horse" names one and only one object|namely fx : x is a horseg. Hence `the
extension of the extension of the concept `horse" has the same referent as `the
extension of the concept `horse":
nE(E(a)) = E(a):
There is no reason to suppose that this particular equivalence cannot be it-
erated repeatedly.69 Thus, Schirn's regress argument holds for extensions of
non-singular concepts. It also holds for singular concepts and extensions of sin-
gular concepts. However, it does not hold for non-singular concepts|at least,
the evidence for it is not as compelling as in the other three cases|and this
means that Runo's claim that the expression `the extension of A' is not se-
mantically vacuous holds. For, if it were, then we would not be able to tell the
cases when the regress argument holds from those when it does not.
Furthermore, while he is committed to saying that expressions which occur
69 Though it may be the case that there are other expressions apart from `the extension of'
which, when combined with the function for the denite article, yield a complex expression
which is not able to be iterated in the same manner.
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as grammatical subjects must refer to objects, he can defer the question as to
exactly what object they refer to. Frege only ever gives a contextual denition
of the course-of-values function. Given that it is in the context of a proposition
that expressions garner meaning, we need only be able to identify the refer-
ence of an entire proposition in which the sub-sentential term `the extension
of x' occurs. We cannot ask what `the extension of x' refers to, as this is an
incomplete expression, an unsaturated function Nevertheless, we can ask what
`the extension of `the extension of horse" refers to. The iteration can be freely
performed just so long as there are no empty argument places; we know that
there are no empty argument-places exactly when the whole expression refers
to an object.
Thus we can see that the denite article occupies an important, though
perhaps peculiar, place in Frege's logic. It is a symptom of his latent Transcen-
dental Idealism that Frege takes synactic categories as prior to ontological ones.
This manifests formally as the function for the denite article, which imposes a
strong relationship between objects and their proper names (equivalently, their
their singleton sets). This relationship is of a ner nature that either Schirn or
Run give full credit too.
Nevertheless, this is but one corner of a much larger programme. Having
taken note of the ner aspects of how the function for the denite article func-
tions for Frege in his later period, we shall now survey some further aspects of
the Grundgesetze in order to ascertain whether Frege may have actually been
aware of anything along the lines of the reections we have just carried out.
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3.5 The Denition of One-One Correspondence: the Role of the
Denite Article
Sections 34{40 of Grundgesetze I, roughly half of a section entitled `Particular
Denitions', form the beginning of Frege's absolutely rigorous attempt at the
nal proof that arithmetic brooks no equal|that for any rational being, the
science of number is as we see it. In what follows, we will inspect each step in
Frege argument for signs that he was possessed of the particular conception of
the denite article which (if the argument above holds) is implied by the com-
bination of his remarks in `On Concept and Object' with the formal denition
given in x11 of the Grundgesetze.
3.5.1 The Function  a : Representing a Concept by its Extension
This function is used to represent a rst-level function by an object, its course-
of-values. This technique of representability enables Frege to have objects stand
in the roles of (rst-level) concepts|thus validating his claim that numbers are
both objects and the extensions of concepts. In x34, Frege denes70  a  as
j n
0BB@ g g(a) = 
u = g()
1CCA = a a u:
The statement within the brackets contained in the deniens is of the existential
form, which in modern notation is an instance of the unsaturated form
9G(u = fx : x is a Gg ^G( ) = ( )):
However, this is prexed by the functional operator `n', which takes the function
described in the brackets as its argument.  a  is the denite article of what
70 Frege uses the symbol `j ' in place of ` ' when giving a denition.
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is contained in the large brackets; hence  a  refers to a singular object.
Frege begins his elucidation with an example, and then proceeds to the
denition given above. Just as in his denition of n, this function has two
kinds of cases. He states:
In the rst instance it is only a matter of designating the value of
the function () for the arguments , i.e., (), by means of \"
and \()". I do so in this way:
\ a ()"
which is to mean the same as [Gleichbedeutend sein] \()". The
object () thus appears as the value of the function of two argu-
ments  a  for  as -argument and () as -argument.
Thus, if  is a second-level function and  is 's course-of-values, then
 a () = ()
names the True. In x35, Frege goes on to state the denition of  a  must
always denote something (recall the universal nature of logic); this is the aim
of the informal argument he gives in x34, which results in the following:71
a a u =

(a) if u = (), or
(  = ) otherwise.
In cases where u is not a course-of-values we still obtain a singular, dened
object: the empty set. This safeguards Frege's methodological stipulation that a
function never give an output `less well-dened' than the corresponding input.72
71 Frege's explanation runs thus: \If the -argument is a course-of-values, then the value of
the function  a  is the value, for the -argument as argument, of the function whose course-
of-values is the -argument. If on the other hand the -argument is not a course-of-values,
then the value of the function  a  for any -argument is (  = )." (x34)
72 This is the result of inferential correspondence; cf. Chapter Two, x2.3.1
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Another example of representing a function by its course-of-values is given
in x35. It revolves around the second-level function symbolised as `(2)'. This
function is rst introduced in x22, and its primary purpose is to serve as an
elucidatory example. There it is dened as `property of the number 2': we are
given this function
(2)
a a = 2
(a)
as `property of the number 2 that belongs to it exclusively'.73 Back in x35 Frege
says that `property of the number 2' can be written as \2 a ()". We are
told that \This is still the name of a second-level function; but if we write \"
for \()", then we have in \2 a " the name of a rst-level function."74 As a
rst-level function, only an object can serve as the -argument in 2 a ; thus
we have two cases, one where the object  is a course-of-values, and another
where it is not.
In the rst case, the value of 2 a  is the same as that of (2). This
is because the argument for 2 a  is (), whereas the argument for (2)
is (). Substituting , a metalinguistic variable for a denite object, for ,
which denotes an empty argument place, yields (2). Following the substitution
procedure described in x34 (above) which is essentially 	())  a 	(), we
are given 2 a 	().
If, however, the -argument of 2 a  is not a course-of-values, then there
is no counterpart argument for the second-level function (2). This results in
73 In modern notation: :[8x(x ! x = 2) ! :(2)]. This is equivalent to 8x(x ! x =
2) ^ (2); we can reverse the order of the conjuncts, yielding (2) ^ 8x(x ! x = 2), which
is the intuitive rendering of `property of the number 2 that belongs to it exclusively'. For
example,  could be `is an even prime'.
74 x35
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the relationship of mutual representation between the two functions ((2) and
2 a ) breaking down. To see why this is so, we shall now examine Frege's
formal denition in greater detail.
Frege denes the function a a u as the denite article of the function
g g(a) = 
u = g()
. As stated at the beginning of this section, this statement is
of the `9G(u = fx : x is a Gg ^G( ) = ( )) form. Accordingly, we shall analyse
the two statements contained within the parentheses, before evaluating what
the appended existence claim amounts to.
The rst statement, u = g(), states that an object u is identical with
the course-of-values of the function g. As the function being dened is a a u,
then we know that according to the denition, a a g() (subject to the caveat
described two paragraphs above; we shall come to this when discussing the
existence claim). The second statement, g(a) = , is slightly more complex
due to the presence of both Latin and Greek letters (a and ). Frege instructs
us that \ g g() = 
  = g()
is the True if there exists a rst-level function of one
argument whose value for the argument  is  and whose course-of-values is
 ."75 The `function of one argument' is g, and we have that g() =  is the
True, where  is a member of g(). Now, because   = g(), and our statement
is of a conjunctive form, we have that g of any member of   is the True.
However, this whole statement is prexed by (the Begrisschrift equivalent
of) a `there exists', applying to g; thus, it is being entertained that there is a
function which satises the two conditions discussed above. If such a function
75 x34
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does exist, then g g() = 
  = g()
is the True. The next part of the denition
is the fact that the function is prexed by a `', and the  is replaced by an
. This means that we are now discussing this function's course-of-values. It
takes two arguments,   and ; if   is a course-of-values and  is a member
of this course-of-values, then the function is a name for the True. Thus, its
course-of-values is g's course-of-values.
However, the function for the course-of-values, () is itself preceded by
the function-name for the denite article, n. Thus, we are talking about the
course-of-values of the function ` g g() = 
  = g()
'. This will be the collection
of objects which are members of the course-of-values of g, as long as the two
conjunctive conditions of the denition are satised; otherwise, it will be the
function itself. That is, the function for the course-of-values, taking the function
contained within the parentheses as argument. If that which is contained within
the parentheses is a name for the False, then by virtue of the fact that the course-
of-values for the false is  = , this becomes the argument for n. Seeing as
 = (  = ), then the value of the whole is  = , as Frege argues.
Observe the vital role that the function for the denite article is playing
here. Both cases of the function preceded by the denite article are names for
singular objects; either the course-of-values of g, or the empty set. In both
cases, there is an individual object taken as argument for n.
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3.5.2 Double Courses-of-Values: Extension of a Relation
The course-of-values of a function whose value is always a truth-value is termed
the extension of a concept. We now move to concepts of two (or more) argu-
ments, which Frege terms `relations'. Thus the courses-of-values of of relations
are likewise extensions.
Because relations require two arguments to become saturated, we have
courses-of-values which are in some respects more complex. For instance, Frege
gives the example of addition as a function of two arguments ( + ). We can
supply only one argument, which we can tentatively term a `partial satura-
tion', as in ` + 3', where `3' is given as the -argument. The course-of-values
of this function is ( + 3). Now, reversing our partial saturation, we have a
course-of-values which looks like (+ ).
Following the reections of the previous section, we can apply the function
 a  to (+ ). Considering our operation of partial saturation, we can set
 to be an argument (as opposed to the whole course-of-values) which gives us
 a (+ ) = (+):
This sentence describes the event in which  a () = (), where  is
itself an instance of the course-of-values function, namely ( + ). Now, as
 a ( + ) = ( + ), we can iterate the operation further by adding
another argument,  , though this argument is for the above result and not for
the addition function itself. This can be symbolised thus:
  a ( a (+ )) =   a (+)
Now, `  a ( + )' is of the same form as  a . Seeing as  a  = (),
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we can obtain   a (+) =   +, the addition function.76 We now have
  a ( a (+ )) =   a (+) =   +;
which gives us
  a ( a (+ )) =   +:
We have on the left a double course-of-values, and on the right, a function of
two arguments. Frege tells us that \. . . in the double course-of-values [whose
name occurs] on the left-hand side is captured what is peculiar to the function
[whose name occurs] on the right-hand side, what distinguishes it from other
rst-level functions of two arguments."77 Now, what is it that is peculiar to
any given rst-level function of two arguments? The collection of objects which
when used to saturate the function will render a name of the True; that is to
say, that which identies a rst-level function with another and separates it
from all non-identical others|its course-of-values. It is this sort of `identity of
indiscernibles' which Frege codied in his basic law V.78
As in the case for single courses-of-values, we may ask what value   a
( a ) assumes if  is not a double course-of-values. Frege distinguishes two
such cases: the rst, in which  is not a double, but a single course-of-values,
76 It may be more pedagogical to explain the transition like this: we have   a (+), and
wish to obtain   + , or alternatively, +( ;). We have the general case,  a  = ().
The `variable' in ( + ) is the ; thus we substitute   for  and drop the , as we are no
longer talking about a course-of-values. This yields   +
77 x36; additions by translator
78 Basic Law V, with the identity sign conceived of as a biconditional, has both a `safe'
direction and an `unsafe' direction. The safe direction is f() = g()
a f(a) = g(a)
, which Frege calls
(Va). The converse, (Vb), is the unsafe direction which leads to Russell's paradox. Thus, it
seems that so long as we are given the equivalence of two functions for all arguments, we can
infer the equivalence of their courses-of-values. It is the converse inference, from equivalent
courses-of-values to equivalent functions, which proves inconsistent. This situation is handled
in modern set theories such as ZF via a restricted comprehension axiom; the `restriction' is to
sets which are already given, or shown to exist. If we follow the discussion of courses-of-values
above, and think of fxg as the name for x, then equivalent objects will have the same name.
However, two objects' bearing of the same name does not guarantee that they are the same
object.
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results in   a ( a ) = (  = ). The second, in which  is not a course-
of-values at all, results in  a 's coincidence with (  = ). In this case
  a ( a ) =   a (  = ). Thus,   a ( a ) = (   =  ); hence
  a ( a ) is the False. Either way, if  is not a double course-of-values,
then   a ( a ) is the False. To summarise:
  a ( a ) =
8<:
the True, if  = ((; )) for some  where ( ;) is
the True;
the False otherwise
Notice that the function for the denite article, n does not itself occur in the
above denition. However, it is `built in' to the function  a , which serves as
the basis for   a ( a ); we talk of the extension of a relation. We shall now
see the use that Frege puts his extensions of relations to.
3.5.3 The Function I: Many-One Relations
In x23 of the Grundgesetze, Frege stipulates the condition under which a relation
is considered many-one. In modern terminology, a many-one relation is called
functional. For a relation R to be many-one, it must be the case that if an
object is R-related to any two (or more) objects, then those objects are identical
(i.e. are the same object). The notion that all inputs have singular outputs is
vital to the modern concept of a function|however, this does not bar the case
in which a given output can be the result of distinct inputs.79 An example
is the squaring function, x2 = y; for we have both 12 = 1 and ( 1)2 = 1.
However, it is impossible that squaring the same number multiple times could
give dierent results. Richard Heck, in his (1993), gives a modern equivalent of
79 When this case also is barred, the relation is called one-to-one; we consider this in due
course
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Frege's denition:80
Func(R) df 8x8y(Rxy ! 8z(Rxz ! y = z))
Heck notes that his denition makes no mention of courses-of-values, but deals
directly with relations. This means that in Heck's modern formulation, no def-
inite articles are required, becasue we are speaking directly of functions (in
Frege's terminology), and not objects. Frege begins in x23 with a similar stip-
ulation, which runs thus:
e d a d = a
X(e; a)
X(e; d)
If the relation X is many-one, then the above statement is always the True.
However, Frege wishes to use a rst-level equivalent of this second-level func-
tion (it takes the relation X as argument), so makes use of his technique of
representing rst-level functions by their courses-of-values. Because we can
represent relations by their extensions (that is, functions of two arguments by
their double courses-of-values), we can replace the `X(e; d)' in the above state-
ment with `e a (d a X)'.81 This yields his denition of a relation's being
functional, given by the symbol `Ip', where p is a relation:
j
0BBBBBBBBB@
e d a d = a
e a (a a p)
e a (d a p)
1CCCCCCCCCA
= Ip
This denition is object-oriented, unlike that given above; through the presence
of courses-of-values we know that the denite article is present. Frege describes
80 Heck (1993) `The Development of Arithmetic in Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik ' in
Demopoulos (ed, 1995) Frege's Philosophy of Mathematics
81 Similar considerations hold for the other occurrences of X
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the function-symbol Ip as being the truth-value of  a ( a p)'s|that is, the
p(; )'s|being a many-one (functional) relation. This means that \for every
-argument there [is] either no -argument, or only one, for which the value of
the function is the true, or, as we can also say, for every object there being at
most one object to which it stands in the relation  a ( a )."82.
3.5.4 The Function i: The Relation of `Being Many-One'
We are examining this part of the Grundgesetze with a view toward the role of
the denite article in Frege's denition of equinumerosity. Frege states that his
denition has not changed substantially since the Grundlagen. In that work,
he says
. . . the proposition
\to every object which falls under G there stands in the relation 
an object falling under F"
means that the two propositions
\a falls under F"
and
\a does not stand in the relation  to any object falling under G"
cannot, whatever a may be, both be true together. (Grundlagen,
x72; cited in Grundgesetze x38)
82 Grundgesetze x37
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The relation  that Frege speaks of is one which must obtain if the phrase `the
concept F is equinumerate with the concept G' is to name the True (notice the
denite articles).83 In Begrisschrift, this can be symbolised as
d F (d)
a G(a)
(d; a)
Or, in modern notation, 8x[8y(xy ! :Gy) ! :Fx]. If in Frege's denition
we represent the concept F with a course-of-values  a  , concept G with a
course-of-values  a , and the relation by the double course-of-values  a
( a ), then Frege's denition of equinumerosity can be written
d d a  
a a a 
d a (a a )
If we append the condition that  is a many-one relation (which we surely want
it to be, if it is to underpin equinumerosity), then we get the following formula:
d d a  
a a a 
d a (a a )
I
Remember that `I' is an abbreviation for the formula which expresses (the
truth-value of) the relation  a ( a )'s being many-one. Hence, the above
formula states that the relation  correlates all d's which are  's to a's which
83 Slightly more formally, F = G i 8x(Fx ^:9y((x; y) ^:Gy)). We will come to a more
rigorous formulation, including the conditions the relation  must fulll, in due course.
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are 's, and that  is many-one|for every d which is a  , there is at most one
a which is a  that is -related to that d.
This is itself a relation, a two-place function for the arguments   and .
Thus, it has a (double) course-of-values, which is symbolised as

0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
d d a 
a a a 
d a (a a )
I
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
This double course-of-values is itself a value, for the above as a single-argument
function on the argument  (yet another example of Frege's utilisation of multi-
ple analysability in his Begrisshrift). Hence Frege introduces an abbreviation
for this function, ip, which is dened as
j 
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
d d a 
a a a 
d a (a a p)
Ip
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
=ip:
As this function takes the argument p and gives as its value a double course-of-
values we can substitute it in   a ( a ) without predeterminately being given
the False (see x3.5.2). So we will have   a ( ai), which, by substitution of
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the denition of ip, will be
  a
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
 a 
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
d d a 
a a a 
d a (a a )
I
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
By the way Frege has set up the technique of representing rst-level functions
by their courses-of-values, the above formula denotes the same truth-value as
d d a  
a a a 
d a (a a )
I
:
Thus, the truth-value of the above formula, and hence that of i, as that of the
relation  a ( a ) putting the objects which belong to  a   in a many-one
correspondence with those object belonging to  a . Frege calls this relation
a `mapping' relation. Heck puts it in modern notation thus:
Mapxy(R)(Fx;Gy) df Func(R)84 ^ 8x(Fx! 9y(Rxy ^Gy))85
However, Heck notes that due to the nature of Frege's system|specically,
his extensive use of contraposition|this denition is more accurately rendered
Map(R)(F;G) df Func(R) ^ 8x[8y(Rxy ! :Gy)! :Fx].
84 [Heck's `Func(R)' is equivalent to Frege's `I'.]
85 see p.266 of his (1993).
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3.5.5 The Function U: Converse of a Relation
The function U is that which names the converse of the relation . If R(; )
is the relation ` is the parent of ', then UR(; ) will be ` is the ospring
of '. Frege approaches the denition of a converse via the representation of a
relation by its extension (its double course-of-values; an object, hence referred
to by an expression containing a denite article).
Given a the extension of a relation , U will be the extension of the converse
of . The denition of U is given in the following form:
j ( a ( a p) = Up
It is then stated that if we have a relation  a ( a U), which by the above
denition is equivalent to  a ( a ( a ( a ), then this relation is
equivalent to  a ( a ) (notice that the order of  and  has been reversed).86
Thus, this function takes a relation as input and gives its extension as an output;
this can then be used to obtain the extension of the extension of that relation,
which yields the converse.
3.5.6 The Function A: Mappings Between Relations
By the previous denition, if we have  a ( a ), we can `say the same
things' of the converse of this relation if we replace `' with `U'. Hence,
  a ( ai)
 a (  aiU)
is \is the truth-value of the -relation's mapping the  -
concept into the -concept, and its converse's mapping the -concept into
86 x39
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the  -concept".87 The upper conjunct states that the relation named by 
maps each   to to most one . The lower conjunct states that the converse of
 maps the 's to the  's in the same manner. Thus, the conjunction of the
two states that the  's and 's are in one-to-one correspondence. For each  ,
there is at most one  to which it bears the -relation, and vice versa.
Frege states that if   and  are to be equinumerate concepts, that is, con-
cepts whose courses-of-values contain the same number of objects, then a re-
lationship such as  must obtain between   and . That is, there must be a
way of putting   and  into one-one correspondence. Now, all relations can be
represented by their extensions in the double course-of-values manner: (; )
can be represented by  a ( a ((; )). This technique of representation
makes ineliminable use of the denite article. Thus, a statement of the form
`there is a relation such that it puts  's and 's in a one-one correspondence'
will be a statement which names the truth-value of the statement `there is the
same number of  's as 's'. And hence, we will know that whenever the rst
is true, the second is true also, and vice versa; thus we can deduce the concept
of number purely out of that of a certain type of relation.
However, the statement `there is a relation  such that it puts  's and 's
in a one-one correspondence' is, for Frege, a statement about objects; this is
because of his use of the function for the denite article in the denition of
one-one correspondence. On the other hand, `there is the same number of  's
as 's' is about concepts. Nevertheless the truth-values of the two statements
are in a biconditional relationship (one is only true when the other is; likewise
for falsity). It is the denite article which underwrites this relationship.
87 x40; italics removed
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Now, in modern symbolism, the statement we want will be of the form
9R[Map(R)(F;G) ^Map(ConvR)(G;F )]:88
Seeing as we now that this statement is true under all and only the circum-
stances by which `the number of F 's = the number of G's' is true, we can
proceed by combining the two statements into one of the form `the no. of F 's
= the no. of G's if, and only if, there is a relation between the F 's and the G's
such that for every a which is an F , there is a b which is G, and vice versa'.
Frege gives the following symbolisation of the second part of the phrase:
q   a ( aiq)
 a (  aiUq)
:
As in previous cases, this can be seen as a function of one argument (in this case,
 ) which gives either the True or the False as its value. It will give the True
if there is a relation which puts the two collections in one-one correspondence,
and the False otherwise. As this is a function of one argument which gives only
the True or the False as values, it is a concept; and thus, it has an extension,
which is

0BB@ q  a ( aiq)
 a ( aiUq)
1CCA :
Frege notes that this denition is in accord with that given in x68 of the
Grundlagen, in that \this extension is the Number that belongs to the concept
 a ."89 We can shorten the phrase `Number that belongs to the -concept'
to `Number of the -concept'; likewise, we dene the function Au as a function
on the argument , in the following manner:
j 
0BB@ q  a (u aiq)
u a ( aiUq)
1CCA = Au:
88 This formulation is due to Heck (1993).
89 x40, italics original
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Thus, the function A for the argument u gives the extension of the concept
which states that there is a relation that correlates the u's one-one with the
objects in that concept's course-of-values. In other words, Au is the collection
of objects|itself an object|which are in one-one correspondence with the 's
which form the course-of-values of the concept which states that the 's and
the u's are in one-one correspondence. To quote the passage of the Grundlagen
which Frege refers to, \the Number which belongs to the concept [u] is the
extension of the concept \equal to [i.e. in one-one correspondence with] the
concept [u]." The number of u's|Au|is the collection of courses-of-values of
those concepts which fall under the concept `in one-one correspondence with
the members of u'.
So, to summarise: we have two concepts,  and   which (we hope) are
equinumerous. In order to ascertain this, we must prove three things:
 that there is a relation ' between the extensions of  and   such that
 ' from the  's to the 's is many-one; for each  , there is at most one 
such that '( ;), and
 that the converse holds: for each , there is at most one   such that
'(; ).
Once we know this, we know that the number of  's = the number of 's.
However, we do not know which number this is: whether there is only one  
(and hence one ), or hundreds, or an innite number.90 Frege has (so far)
only given the truth-conditions for the recognition-judgement for the notion of
cardinal number, not that for any individual cardinal numbers.
90 This is Frege's `Julius Caesar' problem.
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This is why Frege does not stop here; he goes on to dene in x41 the number
zero as the extension of the concept `not equal to itself'. No object is non-self-
identical; hence this extension is empty. Next is the number one, which is the
extension of `the extension of the concept `not equal to itself". This extension
contains one object|the empty set. Now all that Frege needs is a denition of
the function ` follows directly in the number-series directly after '.91 With
this done, we have the requirements that any two concepts must satisfy in order
to be numbers that are immediately adjacent in the number-series; we already
have zero and one, so we can progress to two, three, four. . .
3.5.7 Extensions and Frege's Transcendental Idealism
Frege needed logical objects in order to make logic `contentful'. That is to say,
he needed it to be more than it was for Kant; something which is capable of
generating its own content, rather than an empty structure which needs objects
given by intuition to operate on. Via the function  a  Frege equivocates a
function with its course-of-values. The denition of this function makes neces-
sary use of the function for the denite article; in order to represent a function
by its course-of-values, we must be able to speak of `the course-of-values of
the function f '. From this come double-courses-values, and the specic case of
extensions of relations.
Thus, Frege believed that he had found a way to derive the dening aspects
of the science of number from the laws of thought alone. Such a conclusion,
though it goes against Kant in that Frege claimed that arithmetic is analytic,
also ensures that the laws of (cardinal) number are themselves unique. No ra-
91 x43
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tional alternative is possible; Kant's claim of the uniqueness of arithmetic is
preserved. Far from being at a remove from Kant, this is in the very spirit
of Kant's original arguments that all of mathematics is synthetic a priori|
however, Frege has had to go beyond Kant, particularly in terms of epistemic
bounds; Frege claims that arithmetic is a consequence of the structure of ra-
tionality itself, rather than merely that of the human mind. Nevertheless, such
a strong conclusion could only be wrought from a philosophy such as Kant's
Transcendental Idealism. The Empiricism and Formalism of the time were in
no way deep enough to yield such strong conclusions, a fact that Frege himself
ascertained in the negative portions of the Grundlagen and the Grundgesetze.
This is because Frege's denition is motivated by the very uses which arith-
metic is put to: verifying whether there are the same number of x's as y's,
the same number of x's as y + z's, and so on. The rst phrase Frege xes the
meaning of is `has the same number as'; the contextual denition of number
precedes the explicit denitions (of zero, one, and [Frege's version of] the suc-
cessor function). And hence, this science of number is such that it needs no
further explanation for its applicability. Frege's logicism meets the issue which
confronts the Formalist. And as it is so intimately related to the very nature
of rationality, it precedes all experience|the Empiricist is dispatched. Given
a world where rational minds are present, there is one and only one way to
arithmetically comprehend that world.
The existence of logical objects must also be a consequence of the structure
of rationality of Frege's logicism is to work. However, the relationship between
function and object is a sticking point in Frege's philosophical logic. At times,
the distinction is stated categorically and forcefully; at other times, such as the
exposition of the denite article, it seems as thought Frege wants to equivocate
an object with the class containing only that object. In `On Concept and Object'
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Frege gives convincing reasons for seeing `the concept horse' as referring to an
object, rather than a concept. In the Grundgesetze, rst-level concepts are
represented y their courses-of-values. This technique of representation makes
ineliminable use of the denite article, and is itself exploited extensively in the
construction of the laws of arithmetic. And, as argued in x3.4.1, the behaviour
of Frege's function for the denite article is not even that well understood in
modern investigations of Frege's logic and philosophy.
4. CONCLUSION
We have come to the end of a long road. We began with the question, what are
the constitutive factors in a change of mathematical setting? Two decisive as-
pects of such a conceptual shift were identied. These are (1) that the problems
which motivate the development of the new setting spring from issues with the
old, and (2) that addressing these problems makes use of resources unavailable
to the old setting. Philosophical analysis revealed that standard contemporary
attitudes toward the `foundations' of mathematics, especially those which cou-
ple set theory with a Platonic realism about sets, are thoroughly inadequate to
the task of accommodating the very real occurrences of setting-changes which
have taken place in the history of mathematics.
We then moved onto an analysis of one of the greatest setting-changes in
recent history: the almost spontaneous development of a mathematical logic
very near to that in use today by Gottlob Frege in the last decades of the 19th
century. However, our reections cautioned us against seeing Frege's innovations
as anything near `spontaneous'. In order to fully understand any change of
setting, we must be able to place it in a wider context. Doing so should explain
why the change of setting had to occur in order to solve the problems which
motivated its inception in the rst place.
We found that Kant's inuence on Frege was to motivate him to show that
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alternative sciences of number are not only inconceivable, but impossible. The
development of non-Euclidean geometries had imploded Kant's philosophy of
mathematics in the minds of most mathematicians; Frege's claim that arith-
metic is analytic, rather than synthetic (as Kant had argued), was simply the
best way to ensure that there could be no logically valid alternative|no `non-
Peano arithmetics', as it were. This serves to satisfy condition (1), for we know
that Frege was addressing an issue which directly relates his work to a philo-
sophical tradition that spans at least a hundred years. He was attempting to
solve a problem which was already present in the old setting; `can Kant's claims
about the universal validity of arithmetic be dispatched in the same manner as
his claims about geometry?'.
In order to verify condition (2), we had to look deeper, into Frege's formal
system itself. There we found that his way of formalising the relationship be-
tween objects and our syntactic methods of identifying them is both in line with
the view that he is changing settings (in terms of condition (1)) and is some-
what opposed to modern set theory's formalisation of the connection between
an object and its unit class. We were then able to use these conclusions to
comment on a contemporary debate in the history of philosophy|the so-called
`paradox of the concept horse'|and found that both sides of this debate had
neglected to look for answers in the context of a wider reading of Frege, one
which considers him both as, and from the perspectives of, a mathematician
and a philosopher.
This last comment is important. The research carried out in this thesis does
not belong entirely to mathematics, nor to philosophy, nor even to history. We
have blended all three disciplines together in order to gain new perspective on
a historical gure. We do this out of the desire for greater understanding, not
only of why things happened the way they did, but why they had to happen
139
that way. Furthermore, this historical research into mathematics has led to
new conclusions in contemporary philosophy. Very few great gures of history
can be fruitfully observed from only one angle. We must encourage more inter-
disciplinary investigations into the history of the sciences if we are to gain a
more illuminating view of our past, and thus, ourselves.
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